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THE REGULATION OF LAWYERS IN COMPLIANCE 
Jennifer M. Pacella* 
Abstract: The field of compliance has exploded in interest, attention, and growth over 
recent years. It has emerged as a popular career path for those trained in the law, giving rise to 
an influx of job opportunities for new law school graduates and seasoned attorneys alike. 
Additionally, compliance has tightened the essential interplay between business and law. 
Numerous compliance officers hold J.D. degrees and many also serve simultaneously as both 
an organization’s chief compliance officer and general counsel, thereby muddying the lines 
between which service constitutes the “practice of law,” requiring adherence to professional 
rules of responsibility, or non-legal work, where such rules would typically not be applicable.  
This Article will analyze these important distinctions, as well as the lack of regulatory guidance 
for lawyers in the compliance function, by viewing the discussion largely through the lens of 
an often-unnoticed ethical rule—the American Bar Association’s Model Rule 5.7—which 
requires lawyers to comply with the full range of professional conduct rules even when they 
are providing a non-legal “law-related service.” This Article will argue that the compliance 
function is a near-precise fit for this rule and will propose reform to the current regulatory 
model to ensure that the interests of lawyers, as well as the recipients of their services, are 
protected to the most fruitful extent possible in today’s compliance-driven era. While placing 
this examination in the context of current scholarly debate that challenges traditional “zealous 
advocate” models of attorney representation, this Article will claim that, without adequate and 
clear regulatory reform to establish guidelines for behavior, lawyers in compliance functions 
risk heightened personal liability due to potential ethical violations from their respective 
jurisdictions of admission. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The new era of heightened regulation in which we live has given rise 
to a compliance boom. The need for entities to navigate the complexities 
of regulation in their respective industries has established the field of 
compliance as its own distinct discipline and has thrust the role of 
compliance officers to the forefront, which, in turn, has garnered 
significant attention from the entire legal profession, including both legal 
scholars and practitioners.1 Lawyers play a crucial role in the compliance 
function as experts in interpreting and analyzing legal mandates, rules, 
and statutes, thereby rendering skills that add significant value across a 
wide range of industries.2 
While the position of compliance officer does not require a law degree 
or license, it is often the case that a lawyer holds this role.3 According to 
surveys documenting the issue, the general counsel serves simultaneously 
                                                   
1. See, e.g., Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, Turning Corporate Compliance into Competitive 
Advantage, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 285, 338 (2017) (noting that a “growing array of regulatory mandates 
and modes of regulatory enforcement” has contributed to compliance as a significant area of focus 
for legal and business activity and academic and industry-related interest); Veronica 
Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1004 (2017) (“Compliance 
is king, and its subjects—regulators, prosecutors, courts, corporations, and academics—are quick to 
tout its power and potential for good.”); Teresa Meek, In A Risky World, Chief Compliance Officers 
Move To Center Stage, FORBES (May 31, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adp/2017/05/31/in-a-
risky-world-chief-compliance-officers-move-to-center-stage/ [https://perma.cc/CKL2-7NRN] 
(discussing how the “steady rise in regulations” has given way to Chief Compliance Officers playing 
crucial roles in companies and industries of all types). 
2. See Richard S. Gruner, General Counsel in an Era of Compliance Programs and Corporate Self-
Policing, 46 EMORY L.J. 1113 (1997) (noting that the familiarity of lawyers with legal standards will 
allow them to add value to the creation of the criteria and strategies used in an entity’s compliance 
monitoring system); Dana A. Remus, Out of Practice: The Twenty-First-Century Legal Profession, 
63 DUKE L.J. 1243, 1270 (2014) (stating that possession of a law license for a compliance officer, 
which “signal[s] legal knowledge and experience” is a valuable component of the hiring process). 
3. See, e.g., Todd Haugh, The Criminalization of Compliance, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1215, 1245 
(2017) (“The optimal skill set [of a compliance officer] naturally skews personnel toward lawyers. 
For high-level compliance positions the trend is even more pronounced. Top compliance officers at 
major corporations are often not just attorneys, but many are former prosecutors and regulatory 
agents.”); Tanina Rostain, General Counsel in the Age of Compliance: Preliminary Findings and New 
Research Questions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 481 (2008) (discussing the heightened role of 
attorneys in compliance functions). 
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as chief compliance officer in forty-eight percent of companies.4 While it 
has been historically more common for a joint general counsel/chief 
compliance officer role to exist in smaller entities, data has revealed that 
this duplicate role also commonly emerges in entities that are larger in 
size.5 Within in-house counsel departments, an additional survey revealed 
that forty-one percent of in-house counsel reported that managing 
compliance or regulatory issues is the “greatest priority” for their legal 
teams over the next year.6 In addition, numerous non-practicing lawyers 
(not simultaneously engaged in the general counsel function) have found 
employment in compliance departments, either working as compliance 
officers or as part of a compliance team.7 This considerable influx of 
lawyers in the compliance function is illustrative of the evolution of 
lawyer roles over recent years, continuously shifting from what was once 
predominately a law firm or litigation-based practice to “quasi-legal” 
settings at the intersection of both business and law in which legal 
expertise, while desirable, is not required.8 
                                                   
4. Jamie Saine, Should General Counsels also be Chief Compliance Officers?, CONVERCENT (July 
13, 2015), https://www.convercent.com/blog/should-general-counsels-also-be-chief-compliance-
officers [https://perma.cc/6K8F-2GVH] (citing a PwC State of Compliance survey); see also Kathleen 
M. Boozang, The New Relators: In-House Counsel and Compliance Officers, 6 J. HEALTH & LIFE 
SCI. L. 16, 36 (2012) (noting that compliance officers are often also attorneys); José A. Tabuena & 
Jennifer L. Smith, The Chief Compliance Officer Versus the General Counsel: Friends or Foes?, 8 J. 
HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 23, 23 (2006) (noting that, in many organizations, the general counsel 
also serves as the chief compliance officer). 
5. Tabuena & Smith, supra note 4, at 23; see also Amy E. Hutchens, Wearing Two Hats: In House 
Counsel and Compliance Officer, 29 ACC DOCKET 66, 67 (2011) (“Many in-house counsel wear 
‘two hats’ [and also serve as compliance officers].”).  
6 . Compliance Top Challenge for Legal Departments in 2018, Say 41 Percent Of Lawyers 
Surveyed, ROBERT HALF LEGAL (Jan. 24, 2018), http://rh-us.mediaroom.com/2018-01-24-
Compliance-Top-Challenge-For-Legal-Departments-In-2018-Say-41-Percent-Of-Lawyers-Surveyed 
[https://perma.cc/SUP8-YN8G].  
7. See, e.g., Detailed Analysis of JD Advantage Jobs, NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT (May 
2013), https://www.nalp.org/jd_advantage_jobs_detail_may2013 [https://perma.cc/LF9H-E3KU] 
[hereinafter JD Advantage Jobs, NALP] (noting the prevalence of jobs for law school graduates since 
2011 that do not constitute the practice of law but for which a J.D. is preferred and including 
compliance work as within that category—such jobs have most commonly occurred within “the 
business realm, which accounted for 46% of the JD Advantage jobs obtained by the Class of 2011”); 
Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Training the Heads, Hands and Hearts of Tomorrow’s Lawyers: A Problem 
Solving Approach, 2013 J. DISP. RESOL. 103, 141 (2013) (noting the prevalence of law graduates 
finding work as compliance officers where a J.D. is not required).  
8. See, e.g., Remus, supra note 2, at 1245 (discussing the growing prevalence of lawyers in “quasi-
legal” roles); Jon M. Garon, Legal Education in Disruption: The Headwinds and Tailwinds of 
Technology, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1165, 1225 (2013) (acknowledging that “much of [a lawyer’s] 
specialized work has moved out of the traditional practice of law into the various new fields requiring 
legal accountability as part of a broader statutory compliance regimen.”); Michele DeStefano, 
Compliance and Claim Funding: Testing the Borders of Lawyers’ Monopoly and the Unauthorized 
Practice of Law, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961, 2962 (2014) (noting that an increasing number of 
 
15 Pacella.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/31/20  12:08 AM 
950 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:947 
 
Given these developments, numerous normative questions have 
emerged that prompt the need to define more closely how lawyers in this 
space should be regulated in light of their professional obligations. 
Scholarly and regulatory attention on this very issue has been minimal. 
Existing regulatory models that govern the conduct of lawyers, whether 
practicing law or not, have not kept pace with these recent shifts in the 
legal profession, thereby “remain[ing] fixed—structured around the 
fiction of crisp and clear boundaries between law and business.”9 It is 
incumbent upon the entities that regulate the professional conduct of 
attorneys to adequately respond to this shift. 
While numerous law schools have proactively responded by creating 
courses, concentrations, certificate programs, or centers devoted to the 
compliance field,10 the American Bar Association (ABA) has published a 
non-binding “deskbook” to serve as a user-friendly guide helping 
“compliance professionals to better understand the regulatory and 
enforcement landscapes in which they operate.”11 The targeted audience 
of this book is “the present-day compliance officer” and the content is 
largely a substance-rich summary of compliance-related laws and 
regulations across various industries, including corporate and financial, 
healthcare, environmental, and data security, rather than a guide to the 
regulation of professional conduct.12 The book does not address the extent 
to which, if at all, compliance officers must adhere to the professional 
rules of conduct that govern lawyers but seems to imply that such persons 
                                                   
lawyers are moving into such “quasi-legal jobs, where a legal license is not required but having a law 
degree provides an advantage.”). 
9. Remus, supra note 2, at 1245.  
10. See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol, Teaching Compliance, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 399, 399–400 (2016) 
(noting the “supply side response” of law schools to the increased hiring of lawyers in the compliance 
field, including the development of compliance certificates or degrees); Mikhail Reider-Gordon & 
Elena Helmer, Training the Next Generation of Anti-Corruption Enforcers: International Anti-
Corruption Curriculum in U.S. Law Schools, 14 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 169, 179 (2015) (discussing the 
efforts of several law schools in creating compliance-based curriculum); Julie DiMauro, U.S. 
Compliance Education Expands As Demand Increases – Part One: Law Schools, REUTERS (Dec. 3, 
2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2014/12/03/u-s-compliance-education-
expands-as-demand-increases-part-one-law-schools/ [https://perma.cc/9283-76A8] (discussing the 
efforts of law schools in developing compliance curriculum in response to the uptick in jobs in this 
sector). 
11.  ABA  Compliance  Officer’s  Deskbook,  American  Bar  Association,  https://www.americanba
r.org/products/inv/book/339179898/  [https://perma.cc/3Q32-LVR5]; Andrew S. Boutros, T. 
Marcus Funk & James T. O’Reilly, The ABA Compliance  Officer’s Deskbook (A.B.A. 2016), New 
ABA Comprehensive Guide Helps Compliance Officers to Understand and Manage Risk, A.B.A. 
(June 8, 2017) [hereinafter Compliance Officer’s Deskbook]. 
12. Id. at iii, vi. The authors each have extensive experience as either compliance officers or 
prosecutors for compliance failures. 
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may not be operating as practicing attorneys as they conduct their work. 
That is especially evident in the chapter on “Preserving Legal Privilege,” 
in which it is noted that “lawyers who serve as their company’s 
compliance officer will expect that their communications about risk are 
privileged, but the nuances of that protection are not automatically granted 
to the corporate official whose assigned task is designated as ‘compliance’ 
rather than ‘legal’ officer.”13 The chapter proceeds to note that privilege 
“for the work of the [chief compliance officer] extends to confidential 
information given for the purpose of obtaining legal representation.”14 
However, no further analysis is offered as to which elements of a 
compliance officer’s work, if any, would constitute legal representation 
and trigger application of the rules of professional conduct. 
In addition, the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model 
Rules) offer no similar guidance. Yet upon close examination of all of the 
existing Model Rules, Rule 5.7 stands out as the most on point in this 
context. This rule requires adherence to the full rules of professional 
conduct when a lawyer is rendering “law-related services,” which is 
defined, in part, as those “that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice 
of law when provided by a nonlawyer,” as opposed to “legal services.”15 
The commentary to Rule 5.7 enumerates many examples of various types 
of “law-related services,” including, non-exhaustively, financial planning, 
legislative lobbying, accounting, social work, providing title insurance, 
and patent, medical or environmental consulting. 16  However, the 
compliance function is not mentioned at all here, despite its fitting 
application to this particular rule.17 Aside from not capturing compliance 
work, the current language of the rule fails to provide guidance as to 
navigating the very murky boundaries between legal representation and 
the monitoring, surveillance, and preventative measures that are typically 
                                                   
13. Id. at 124.  
14. Id. at 126 (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 402 (1976)).  
15. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). Rule 5.7 reads as follows: 
(a) A lawyer shall be subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to the provision 
of law-related services, as defined in paragraph (b), if the law-related services are provided: (1) 
by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the lawyer’s provision of legal services 
to clients; or (2) in other circumstances by an entity controlled by the lawyer individually or with 
others if the lawyer fails to take reasonable measures to assure that a person obtaining the law-
related services knows that the services are not legal services and that the protections of the 
client-lawyer relationship do not exist. (b) The term ‘law-related services’ denotes services that 
might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are related to the provision 
of legal services, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided by 
a  nonlawyer. 
16. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7. cmt. 9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
17. See id.  
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descriptive of a compliance officer’s duties.18 
Given this absence of regulatory guidance, the legal profession 
currently lacks clarity as to the extent to which lawyers who are also 
compliance officers must adhere to the full spectrum of professional rules 
that govern typical attorney-client relationships. This lack of clarity, in 
turn, leads to the potential for confusion and a risk of personal liability 
through disciplinary action or sanctions from their respective jurisdictions 
for non-adherence to the rules. At the same time, compliance officers face 
added pressures from governmental regulators, given that numerous 
regulatory agencies have become increasingly active in imposing personal 
liability on compliance officers for the violations of their organizations.19 
As a result, a lawyer’s overall risk of personal liability when providing 
compliance services is considerable. 
This Article will focus on lawyers, in possession of a J.D. and admitted 
to a state bar, who are rendering services as compliance officers or within 
compliance departments and not simultaneously serving as general 
counsel. It will propose reform to the regulatory model that currently 
governs such individuals as a means of mitigating their risk of liability. 
While the limitations of Rule 5.7 have been previously examined in the 
context of lawyers engaged in government roles,20 this Article is the first 
attempt to tackle this dilemma from the specific lens of the rule’s 
applicability to the compliance function. It will proceed in four parts. 
Part I will examine the prevalence of lawyers in compliance and will 
challenge the organized bar’s historical focus on traditional, litigation-
based practice, thereby failing to capture the modern-day panoply of work 
in which a law-trained individual might engage, such as compliance. 
Part II will closely examine the current Rule 5.7 and provide a 
comparative analysis of the results of the author’s state-by-state 
comparison of each jurisdiction’s adoption or non-adoption of this rule. 
                                                   
18. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983); see also James A. 
Fanto, Advising Compliance in Financial Firms: A New Mission for the Legal Academy, 8 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1, 3–4 (2013) (discussing how compliance officers are essential to an entity’s 
oversight or control functions and work closely with regulators to be the “eyes and ears of the firm”).  
19. Brian L. Rubin & Irene A. Firippis, Compliance Wars: SEC and FINRA Disciplinary Actions 
Against Chief Compliance Officers and In-House Counsel in a Galaxy Not Too Far Away, PRAC. 
COMPLIANCE & RISK MGMT. SEC. INDUSTRY, (July–Dec. 2014), https://us.eversheds-
sutherland.com/portalresource/Compliance-Wars_SEC-and-FINRA-Disciplinary-Actions.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3Q26-68AV] (discussing the significant increase in cases brought by the SEC and 
FINRA against compliance officers since 2014).  
20. See Hugh D. Spitzer, Model Rule 5.7 and Lawyers in Government Jobs—How Can They Ever 
Be “Non-Lawyers”?, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 45 (2017) (presenting a robust discussion of the 
shortcomings of Rule 5.7 as it pertains to the governance of lawyers in policy or management roles 
in government positions). 
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The author has found that, to date, fifteen of the fifty states have not 
adopted Rule 5.721 and the remaining thirty-five states have not uniformly 
conformed their rule to the ABA version.22 The author will argue that 
while the compliance function is not likely to be considered the “practice 
of law,” it constitutes a “law-related service” that would mandate 
adherence to Rule 5.7. Part III will discuss the various personal liability 
concerns of lawyers in compliance roles that would stem from adherence 
to all of the professional rules of conduct due to Rule 5.7 and the general 
tensions that emerge between the legal and compliance functions in an 
organizational setting. Finally, Part IV will propose reform to Rule 5.7 to 
better address the vulnerable position of compliance officers who provide 
non-legal services across various industries. 
I. THE COMPLIANCE BOOM 
A. Influx of Lawyers in Compliance 
The field of compliance was once a “a virtually unknown topic”23 and “not 
traditionally the exclusive domain of lawyers,”24 but has since emerged as 
one of the most vibrant sources of employment and research for the legal field 
as a whole. Two decades ago, compliance could be described as “a bit of a 
backwater,” as a field that was not particularly specialized and did not 
necessarily attract individuals of any particular skillset—“[c]ompliance 
officers tended to work in cubicles and performed a sort of glorified 
bookkeeping task, making sure that forms were filled out and boxes 
checked.”25  Today, the landscape is extremely different, as the field of 
compliance and the role of the compliance officer now boast better salaries, 
expansive and collaborative departments, increased prestige, and provide 
insight on crucial and strategic decisions of an organization.26 Compliance 
departments play a crucial role in organizations through their preventative 
                                                   
21. See ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; CONN. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT; HAW. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; KY. RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT; LA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; MISS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; MONT. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; 
OR. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; TEX. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; VA. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT; WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT. All of these lack some version of Model Rule 5.7. 
22. See infra section III.B. 
23. Geoffrey P. Miller, Compliance: Past, Present and Future, 48 U. TOL. L. REV. 437, 437 (2017).  
24. Fanto, supra note 18, at 17. 
25. Miller, supra note 23, at 437. 
26. Id. at 438–39 (“While there is still some of the check-the-box quality to the compliance 
function—and there always will be—the job of compliance has increasingly moved away from a 
mechanical approach to a risk-based approach.”). 
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focus. Although “compliance” is often subject to varying definitions,27 
one succinct way to describe it is as “a field that focuses on prospectively 
ensuring adherence to laws and regulations through the use of monitoring, 
policies, and other internal controls.”28 
The growth of the compliance function has come about largely as a 
response to the extraordinary complexity in regulation over recent 
decades, and has increased in attention with the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission’s amendment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1991 
to include the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (OSG).29 The OSG 
are based on a “carrots and sticks” model, with the carrot being a 
significantly reduced fine for organizations that adopt effective 
compliance programs and the stick being the placement of the 
organization on probation without any reduced penalty if compliance 
programs are not adopted.30 To obtain the carrot of a significantly reduced 
fine, the OSG lists several steps for a court to consider when determining 
the effectiveness of a compliance program, which include: procedures for 
reducing the risk of criminal activity; oversight by high-level individuals; 
limited discretionary authority granted to any individual likely to be 
criminally active; communication of the program to all employees; the use 
of monitoring, auditing, and reporting systems; and disciplinary action for 
any violations of the program.31 These steps were intentionally adopted in 
a general tone to allow organizations some flexibility in tailoring a 
compliance program specific to their needs.32 
                                                   
27. See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
2075, 2086, 2092–93 (2016) (noting that the definition of compliance has multiple interpretations but 
common themes exist to describe the field and what constitutes “effective” compliance). 
28. Eric C. Chaffee, Creating Compliance: Exploring A Maturing Industry, 48 U. TOL. L. REV. 429, 429 
(2017) (noting also that “[n]ow is a watershed period for the compliance industry.”); see also GEOFFREY P. 
MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE 137 (Wolters Kluwer, ed., 
2017) (defining compliance as “a form of internalized norm enforcement within organizations”).  
29. See, e.g., Robert C. Bird & Stephen K. Park, Organic Corporate Governance, 59 B.C. L. REV. 
21, 45 (2018) (stating that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are one of the most notable examples 
of federal laws that prompt companies to invest in compliance); David Hess, Ethical Infrastructure 
and Evidence-Based Corporate Compliance and Ethics Programs: Policy Implications from the 
Empirical Evidence, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 317, 318 (2016) (discussing how the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines “ushered in a new era for corporate compliance programs”); Susan L. Martin, Compliance 
Officers: More Jobs, More Responsibility, More Liability, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 
169, 172 (2015) (noting the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1991 first created corporate compliance 
and ethics programs and the compliance officer position).  
30. Hess, supra note 29, at 327.  
31 . U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f)(1) (2012) (noting the reduction of 
culpability in sentencing if the criminal offense occurred when the organization had in effect an 
“effective compliance and ethics program”); see also Hess, supra note 29, at 327–28 (explaining these 
seven steps). 
32. Hess, supra note 29, at 327–28.  
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The focus on compliance has continued steadily since 1991 and was 
enhanced in the wake of the financial crisis from 2007 to 2009 and the 
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) in 2010.33 Even prior to Dodd-Frank, new 
regulatory models governing organizations and businesses were 
beginning to emerge that laid the groundwork for compliance racing to 
the forefront. The post Enron-era and the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 (“SOX”) helped further facilitate a tangible move away from 
traditional, top-down, “command and control” government-dictated 
regulatory schemes to “new governance” models focused on self-
regulation, self-reporting to government, preventative practices, and 
generally more collaboration between regulated entities and regulators.34 
New governance models reflect the collective recognition from regulators 
and public and private entities that the traditional style of top-down 
governance, which addresses problems reactively rather than 
preemptively and proactively, was not effective in avoiding large-scale 
fraud and other violations of the law.35 This recognition prompted the 
need for heightened collaboration among the government, governed 
entities, and other non-state actors. 36  The modern-day compliance 
function can be said to be largely descriptive of new governance models, 
specifically given its emphasis on the development of policies, programs, 
                                                   
33. See Fanto, supra note 18, at 14 (noting that the Dodd-Frank Act has prompted an increase in 
the work of compliance officers); MILLER, supra note 28, at 137–39 (discussing landmarks in the 
history of compliance). 
34. See, e.g., Bird & Park, supra note 1, at 316–17 (referring to new governance models as 
“Collaborative Regulation”); Cristie L. Ford, New Governance in the Teeth of Human Frailty: 
Lessons from Financial Regulation, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 441, 456 n.54 (2010) (discussing the post-
Enron concerns that U.S. GAAP rules “were too rules-based,” as opposed to principles-based, which 
is more descriptive of “new governance”); Jennifer M. Pacella, Conflicted Counselors: Retaliation 
Protections for Attorney-Whistleblowers in an Inconsistent Regulatory Regime, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 
491, 499 (discussing the more centralized governance systems in place prior to Enron); Troy A. 
Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate 
Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 744 n.271 (2005) (explaining that SOX brought about 
various “new governance and disclosure practices”).  
35 . See, e.g., Michael B. Runnels & Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, Cooperative NRDA & New 
Governance: Getting to Restoration in the Hudson River, the Gulf of Mexico, and Beyond, 77 BROOK. L. 
REV. 107, 114 (2011) (describing “new governance” approaches as fostering transparency and 
accountability and approaching corporate decision-making as a collaborative, non-adversarial process). 
36. See, e.g., On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs 
Law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2127 (2008) (describing new governance approaches as 
those that promote self-regulation and government-industry cooperation and enhance problem 
solving); Burkard Eberlein, Kenneth W. Abbott, Julia Black, Errol Meidinger & Stepan Wood, 
Transnational Business Governance Interactions: Conceptualization and Framework for Analysis, 8 
REG. & GOVERNANCE 3, 10 (2014) (discussing transnational business governance and its importance 
in regulating business conduct through a hybrid of public and private institutions and the place of 
regulatory governance in this space).  
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and procedures aimed at detecting red flags and possible and known 
violations of the law, as well as maintaining focus on self-regulation and 
self-reporting.37 In this way, the compliance function’s focus is internal, 
rather than external, thereby encouraging entities to avoid violations 
altogether, rather than facing government investigation or litigation at a 
later point. Given that all entities “exist within a nexus of legal, regulatory, 
and social norms,” compliance may broadly comprise the ways in which 
entities “adapt their behavior to these constraints [or] . . . the set of 
internal processes used by firms to adapt behavior to applicable norms.”38 
Compliance officers also commonly establish ethics programs to facilitate 
adherence to laws and take responsibility for the day-to-day 
implementation and effectiveness of such programs.39  
Despite the potential for variation in the everyday duties of compliance 
officers across the board, their core function is to interpret, assess, and 
facilitate the organization’s adherence to the regulations to which it is 
subject, and to offer advice about such regulations and other pertinent 
laws and the repercussions of non-compliance, all of which are fitting 
characteristics of legally trained individuals. 40  Individuals of varied 
backgrounds and skills may be qualified to work in the compliance field 
but, as many scholars have noted, a lawyer brings a uniquely 
advantageous set of skills to the table and many organizations prefer that 
a lawyer hold the position of compliance officer given their special legal 
training.41 Lawyers in compliance roles advise entities on conforming 
behavior to the complex regulatory climate and often make predictions as 
to how a possible adjudicator would evaluate the entity’s compliance 
                                                   
37 . See Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities 
Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 28 (2008) (“In the compliance context, New Governance permits a 
dynamic and continually reevaluated internal understanding of compliance.”).  
38. Griffith, supra note 27, at 2082.  
39. Id. at 2083 (“[T]he compliance function effectively assumes general responsibility for business 
conduct consistent with social norms.”); Kathleen M. Boozang & Simone Handler-Hutchinson, 
«Monitoring» Corporate Corruption: DOJ’s Use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements in Health 
Care, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 89, 108 (2009) (noting that while “acceptance of corporate ethics and 
compliance programs ultimately depends upon top-down communications,” compliance officers are 
tasked with the duty of ensuring the daily success of such programs).  
40. DeStefano, supra note 8, at 2990 (noting that, on the other hand, some of the skills needed for 
compliance officers, such as project management, technology, and training, may not be traditionally 
taught in law school). 
41. See Ray W. Campbell, The End of Law Schools: Legal Education in the Era of Legal Service 
Businesses, 85 MISS. L.J. 1, 6 (2016) (noting that services once dominated by lawyers “are being 
delivered by non-lawyer organizations with other important skill sets”); William W. Horton, When 
Two Worlds Collide: Ethics Challenges in the Compliance Officer-General Counsel Relationship, 
JONES WALKER LLP (Dec. 2015), https://kipdf.com/queue/when-two-worlds-collide-ethics-
challenges-in-the-compliance-officer-general-coun_5acbb1197f8b9aeb918b45a8.html 
[https://perma.cc/AEV2-Z4AW]. 
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function, thereby offering judgment based on their distinct education and 
expertise. 42  A legal education and/or familiarity and experience with 
reading, interpreting, and applying rules, regulations, and statutes has 
spurred the exponential growth of law students and attorneys to choose 
compliance as a career path.43 
The uptick in lawyers holding compliance positions coincided with an 
era in which traditional employment prospects for new law school 
graduates were at an all-time low largely due to the financial crisis,44 
thereby opening up a wave of “J.D. Advantage” or quasi-legal career 
options in which neither a law degree nor bar passage is required, but is 
desired. 45  Currently, compliance positions across various industries 
comprise one of the largest portions of J.D. Advantage jobs. 46  J.D. 
Advantage jobs reflect “the porousness of legal practice,” resulting in 
numerous employment opportunities for legally-trained persons in 
                                                   
42. Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND. L.J. 1401, 
1440 (2017) (“The lawyer may go beyond a yes or no answer and suggest creative ways that a client 
could alter behavior to increase the likelihood that the adjudicator would find the client 
in  compliance.”). 
43 . See, e.g., Haugh, supra note 3, at 1245 (discussing that lawyers have the optimal skills 
necessary to act as compliance officers); Chaffee, supra note 28, at 435 (noting that the legal academy 
is well-poised to train and contribute to the maturation of the compliance industry); Fanto, supra note 
18, at 16–17 (discussing the potential contributions of the legal academy to the compliance field); 
Sokol, supra note 10, at 399 (noting that compliance is a “JD plus” job where a legal background is 
an advantage to the field).  
44. See, e.g., Bernard A. Burk, What’s New About the New Normal: The Evolving Market for New 
Lawyers in the 21st Century, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 541, 542–43 (2014) (discussing the “dark and 
depressing ‘New Normal’” that the practice of law since the economic downturn may forever be 
different); Felix B. Chang, Foreword, Rethinking Compliance, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 371, 371–72 (2016) 
(noting that the financial crisis has profoundly changed the landscape of legal employment for lawyers 
and has created “a concomitant surge of ‘JD plus’ jobs in corporate compliance,” to which law schools 
have responded by establishing courses in the field for law students); Eric C. Chaffee, Answering the 
Call to Reinvent Legal Education: The Need to Incorporate Practical Business and Transactional 
Skills Training into the Curricula of America’s Law Schools, 20 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 136 
(discussing the struggles of law school graduates to find employment in the post financial crisis era 
and to be paid at rates on par with what was standard prior to the crisis).  
45. See, e.g., Chang, supra note 44, at 371–72 (discussing the onset of “JD plus” jobs after the 
financial crisis); JD Advantage Jobs, NALP, supra note 7 (noting that the term “JD Advantage” 
became a “new term of art” starting with the law school graduating class of 2011); Hillary Mantis, 
What is a J.D. Advantage Career?, NAT’L JURIST (Dec. 3, 2015, 12:50 PM), 
http://www.nationaljurist.com/national-jurist-magazine/what-jd-advantage-career 
[https://perma.cc/8AVM-B5JN] (explaining that not only is this development due to difficulty in 
securing traditional legal jobs, but also due to “the long term desire of many recent law grads to go 
into alternative legal careers”). 
46 . JD Advantage Jobs, NALP, supra note 7 (aside from compliance positions, other J.D. 
Advantage positions have included work as an alternative dispute resolution specialist, a government 
regulatory analyst, or investment banking or consulting work); see also Nancy Moore, The Future of 
Law as a Profession, 20 CHAP. L. REV. 255, 263 (2017) (noting the increased presence of lawyers in 
quasi-legal jobs like compliance officers or “law consultant” jobs).  
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various areas of “law and law-related services shared by lawyers and 
others.” 47  These expansions in compliance are not limited to any 
particular industry, as rapid growth in compliance jobs has run the gamut 
from financial institutions to non-governmental organizations. 48  As a 
result, while law students have traditionally pursued either a litigation or 
a transactional track in their studies, they are now increasingly 
discovering a third option—that of a compliance officer or 
compliance  attorney.49 
B. The Role of Lawyers in Compliance 
The popularity of compliance as a career choice for lawyers reflects the 
changing realities of the profession over recent decades. Traditionally, 
“zealous advocate” served as the sole description of a lawyer’s duties, 
comprising such characteristics as undivided loyalty to client, disregard 
for “all hazards and costs to other persons” in fulfilling that duty, and a 
completely client-centered focus.50 While the zealous advocate model is 
most apt for a “one-to-one attorney-client relationship” engaged in 
litigation, 51  it is not a fitting description for organizational lawyers 
working in modern-day compliance roles. The passage of SOX was 
instrumental in furthering this change. SOX implemented mandatory 
attorney-reporting duties due to a collective recognition that the 
                                                   
47. Judith A. McMorrow, Moving from a Brandeis Brief to a Brandeis Law Firm: Challenges and 
Opportunities for Holistic Legal Services in the United States, 33 TOURO L. REV. 259, 260 
(2017)  (emphasis added). 
48. Mikhail Reider-Gordon & Elena Helmer, Training the Next Generation of Anti-Corruption 
Enforcers: International Anti-Corruption Curriculum in U.S. Law Schools, 14 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 169, 
175 (2015) (noting that, in 2013, J.P. Morgan Chase announced plans to spend an additional $1.5 
billion to create 5,000 new positions in compliance area, constituting a 30% increase in risk-control 
staffing and that even non-governmental organizations have been active in developing 
compliance  programs).  
49. David A. Mata, The New Career Choice: The Compliance Attorney, NAT’L JURIST (Feb. 1, 
2018, 3:33 PM), http://www.nationaljurist.com/lawyer-statesman/new-career-choice-compliance-
attorney [https://perma.cc/ZW6G-KC82]. 
50. MILLER, supra note 28, at 297 (citing distinguished British Attorney, Lord Brougham, from 
1821 for “what is still the best-known justification of the lawyer’s role as zealous advocate.” 
Brougham went on to state “[s]eparating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, [the attorney] 
must go on reckless of the consequences, though it should be his unhappy fate to involve his country 
in confusion.”); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Lawyering for Social Change: What’s A Lawyer to Do?, 
5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 201, 217 (1999) (noting that while the “zealous advocate” role traditionally 
describes the role of an attorney in an adversary system, lawyers must represent their clients “within 
the bounds of the law”). 
51. Shauna I. Marshall, Mission Impossible?: Ethical Community Lawyering, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 
147, 216–17 (2000); see also Lori D. Johnson, The Ethics of Non-Traditional Contract Drafting, 84 
U. CIN. L. REV. 595, 605–06 (2016) (noting that the “zealous advocate” role is not appropriate for 
modern transactional attorneys). 
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“executives and accountants [at Enron] [did] not work alone” but were 
guided by the lawyers “always there looking over their shoulder.”52 As a 
result, Congress included in SOX a provision requiring the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to establish “minimum standards of 
professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the 
[SEC]” when they represent issuer clients.53 The SEC promulgated these 
“Part 205 Rules” (as they have come to be known) in 2003, which state 
that if attorneys become aware of evidence of material violations of the 
law by the issuer or an officer, director, employee, or agent thereof, they 
are required to report this evidence to the issuer’s chief legal officer 
(CLO) or the CLO and chief executive officer (CEO) together.54 If the 
attorney reasonably believes that the CLO and CEO have not adequately 
responded to the report, the attorney is then required to report the matter 
up-the-ladder to the board of directors.55 Failure to report in this manner 
results in SEC-imposed civil penalties.56 
Attorneys also have a permissive disclosure option in which they may 
opt to externally report confidential client information to the SEC if they 
reasonably believe doing so is necessary to prevent substantial financial 
injury to the organization and its investors.57 By requiring lawyers to blow 
the whistle on an internal level and expanding the instances in which they 
may lawfully report externally, the lawyer takes on a heightened public 
interest role that considers the potential negative effects of client behavior 
on various stakeholders, including investors, employees, and the general 
public. These developments contrast considerably with the zealous 
advocate model. 
After the SEC promulgated the Part 205 Rules to satisfy this 
congressional mandate, the ABA followed suit. 58  In 2003, the ABA 
                                                   
52. 148 CONG. REC. S6524-02 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. John Edwards); David 
A. Westbrook, Telling All: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Ideal of Transparency, 2004 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 441, 462 (2004) (discussing Enron as “a dramatic failure of business culture” in which various 
individuals, including lawyers, did not properly carry out their respective roles); see also John C. 
Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1293–
94 (2003) (stating that, in the wake of Enron, “Congress, the SEC, and the public at large all suspect 
that, when sophisticated financial chicanery occurs, lawyers are typically present ‘at the scene of the 
crime’” (internal citations omitted)).  
53. 18 U.S.C. § 7245 (2018); see also Jennifer M. Pacella, Advocate or Adversary? When Attorneys 
Act as Whistleblowers, 28 GEO. J.L. ETHICS 1027, 1039–40 (2015) (discussing the enactment of these 
rules for attorneys).  
54. See 18 U.S.C. § 7245; 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (2019).  
55. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(3). 
56. Id. § 205.6. 
57. Id. § 205.3(d). 
58. Id. § 205.3(b); William Freivogel, Chair, ABA Model Rules and the Business Lawyer, COMM. 
PROF’L RESP., http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/newsletter/0077/materials/ethics.pdf 
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amended Model Rules 1.6 (duty of confidentiality) and 1.13 (organization 
as client) to mirror the new SEC regulations requiring attorney reporting.59 
Current Rule 1.6 permits attorneys to disclose confidential client 
information without client consent in certain circumstances, including to 
prevent a client from committing a crime or fraud “that is reasonably 
certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property 
of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the 
lawyer’s services.” 60  In addition, Rule 1.13, which governs lawyer 
behavior when representing an organization as client, was amended to 
include the same up-the-ladder, mandatory attorney reporting duties as 
SOX.61 Rule 1.13 also allows an attorney to report externally without 
client consent after exhausting internal reporting if the lawyer reasonably 
believes it necessary to prevent substantial harm to the organization, 
thereby establishing a permissive disclosure option that is similar to the 
Part 205 Rules.62 Notably, Model Rule 1.13 extends even further than the 
SOX attorney reporting duties by imposing no limitation on the person or 
entity to whom the lawyer may make the permissive disclosure, thereby 
allowing the lawyer to report to any third party that may suffer financial 
harm due to the organization’s misconduct, as opposed to the Part 205 
Rules that limit external disclosures only to the SEC.63 
The ABA amendments of Rules 1.6 and 1.13 are believed to have 
resulted both from an effort to tame the new federal regulation of attorneys 
through SOX and a general desire on the part of the ABA to enhance a 
lawyer’s facilitation of increased transparency and accountability within 
organizations.64 These amendments and the Part 205 Rules help solidify a 
                                                   
[https://perma.cc/P8H7-YJY9]. 
59. Freivogel, supra note 58 (summarizing the ABA’s amendments of 2003 to Model Rules 1.6 and 1.13).  
60 . MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). These amendments 
expanded upon the exceptions that permit lawyers to disclose confidential information to third parties. 
Am. Bar Ass’n Task Force on Corp. Resp., Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association Task 
Force on Corporate Responsibility July 16, 2002, 58 BUS. L. 189, 203–04 (2002) [hereinafter ABA 
Amendments].  
61. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). Prior to these amendments, 
Rule 1.13’s up-the-ladder reporting obligations were triggered only when misconduct was related to 
the lawyer’s representation and the overall tone of the rule tended to discourage the lawyer from 
taking action to respond to corporate wrongdoing. See ABA Amendments at 203–04. 
62. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT  r. 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
63. Id. (stating simply that the “lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation”); see 
also Pacella, supra note 34, at 538–39 (explaining how Model Rule 1.13 extends disclosure options 
further than that of the Part 205 Rules under SOX). 
64. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen & Susan P. Koniak, Legal and Ethical Duties of 
Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725, 731–33 (2004) (discussing these amendments as a 
result of the “ABA’s desire to keep the SEC and the rest of the federal government at bay”); Jenny E. 
Cieplak & Michael K. Hibey, The Sarbanes-Oxley Regulations and Model Rule 1.13: Redundant or 
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more modern perception of lawyers as “gatekeepers”—individuals who 
play a crucial role in the compliance function by monitoring organizations 
to prevent unlawful and unethical client behavior.65 The “gatekeeper” 
metaphor envisions the lawyer as exercising authority to either permit or 
deny an organization to enter a “gate,” or some business objective, 
depending on whether applicable standards or rules would be violated if 
allowed to proceed.66 A lawyer’s up-the-ladder reporting duties provide 
an “early warning system” for directors (especially those who are 
independent and not involved with daily operations) to raise issues and 
ensure that the entity has proper channels in place to ensure compliance 
with the law. 67  In general, mandatory internal reporting provides 
numerous benefits to organizations within any industry, including 
avoiding the escalation of problems into unmanageable burdens that may 
lead to government investigation, litigation, or financial losses; the 
                                                   
Complementary?, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 715, 728 (2004) (noting that the ABA implemented these 
amendments to address the public’s desire for increased transparency); Peter J. Henning, Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act 307 and Corporate Counsel: Who Better to Prevent Corporate Crime?, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 323, 
341 (2004) (noting that the ABA amendments were intended to “reflect what should be the exercise of 
sound judgment in representing a corporation, that any misconduct by a corporation’s agent or officer must 
be reported to senior management or the organization’s highest authority”). 
65. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 28, at 293 (discussing the important role of gatekeepers in the 
compliance function); Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 413–
14 (2008) (discussing how both inside and outside counsel fulfill their gatekeeping roles); Richard E. 
Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model to Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 B.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1107, 113–14 (2006) (discussing the duties of attorneys to act as “gatekeepers” for the 
organizations that they represent). Other professionals such as accountants and auditors are also 
commonly referred to as “gatekeepers.” See Joseph A. Franco, Of Complicity and Compliance: A 
Rules-Based Anti-Complicity Strategy Under Federal Securities Law, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1, 37, 69 
(2011) (discussing the role of auditors and accountants as gatekeepers).  
66. MILLER, supra note 28, at 293–95 (“The gatekeeper has control over the gate, and accordingly 
can prevent or impede the client from achieving its objective.”); see also Arthur B. Laby, 
Differentiating Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 119, 123–24 (2006) (noting that 
common definitions of gatekeeper include the following: “a reputational intermediary who provides 
verification or certification services to investors,” and one “who is ‘positioned at a critical point in 
the flow of events’ where approval is needed before a transaction can close” (internal 
citations  omitted)).  
67. Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons?, 48 
VILL. L. REV. 1097, 1112–13 (2003) (discussing that “reporting up” has a valuable gatekeeping function, 
including improvement in information flow and early detection of concerning matters); Beverley Earle & 
Gerald A. Madek, The New World of Risk for Corporate Attorneys and Their Boards Post-Sarbanes-
Oxley: An Assessment of Impact and a Prescription for Action, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 185, 202 (2005) 
(discussing how the requirement of reporting up the ladder supports the “SOX mandate that securities 
attorneys act as internal gatekeepers”); Theodore Sonde & F. Ryan Keith, “Up the Ladder” and Over: 
Regulating Securities Lawyers—Past, Present & Future, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 331, 348 (2003) 
(discussing the ABA’s amendments as an effort to promote compliance within entities). 
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promotion of an ethical culture; and an increased likelihood that entities 
can successfully navigate the modern complex web of regulations.68 
In addition, the ability to exercise the permissive disclosure option and 
report out illustrates a heightened focus on self-regulation and self-
reporting to the government and/or the regulating body of the particular 
industry, which are all key concepts in compliance.69 There are many 
examples of current regulatory policies that significantly reduce penalties 
for self-reporting violations of the law. For example, pursuant to the 
SEC’s analytical framework for deciding whether to bring an enforcement 
action against a corporation, the Seaboard Report provides cooperation 
credit to entities that actively self-police and self-report violations and 
cooperate with the agency to rectify the problem.70  Additionally, the 
DOJ’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) Enforcement Policy, now 
permanent after a pilot program instituted under the Obama 
Administration, significantly benefits entities that self-report, fully 
cooperate, and remediate any FCPA-related matters.71 
If these actions are taken, the policy allows an entity to receive a 
declination from criminal charges and, if criminal charges do become 
warranted, self-reporting and cooperation will result in a recommendation 
of a fifty percent reduction off the low end of the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines.72 The DOJ’s Yates Memo of 2015 also provides consideration 
for cooperation under the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
                                                   
68. James A. Fanto, Surveillant and Counselor: A Reorientation in Compliance for Financial 
Firms, 2014 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1163–64 (2014) (discussing the benefits of compliance programs 
and internal reporting); Moberly, supra note 65, at 1132 (2006) (discussing how SOX’s internal 
reporting duties are beneficial to the organization).  
69. See Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defense to 
Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save its Soul?, 47 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 605, 649–51 (1995) 
(discussing the avoidance of liability through self-regulation through compliance programs). 
70. SEC, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE 
ACT OF 1934 AND COMMISSION STATEMENT ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF COOPERATION TO AGENCY 
ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS, EXCHANGE ACT RELEASE NO. 34-44969 (Oct. 23, 2001), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm [https://perma.cc/5587-HCTA]; see also 
Robert W. Tarun & Peter P. Tomczak, A Proposal for a United States Department of Justice Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act Leniency Policy, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 153, 167–70 (2010) (discussing 
cooperation policies); SEC Spotlight, Enforcement Cooperation Program, SEC (Sept. 20, 2016), 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enfcoopinitiative.shtml [https://perma.cc/QN4C-K6SF]. 
71 . U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ENF’T POLICY, (2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/838416/download [https://perma.cc/YXQ9-KM3D] 
[hereinafter Enf’t Policy]; see also Karen Woody, “Declinations with Disgorgement” in FCPA 
Enforcement, 51 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 269, 270–71 (2018) (discussing how the FCPA’s Pilot 
Program, with its focus on incentivizing voluntary disclosure and government cooperation, provides 
for eligibility for a declination from the DOJ).  
72 . Enf’t Policy, supra note 71 (declinations are generally granted “absent aggravating 
circumstances involving the seriousness of the offense or the nature of the offender”).  
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Organizations to entities that make a complete disclosure to the DOJ of 
“all relevant facts about individual misconduct.”73 As such, the Yates 
Memo encourages self-reporting, specifically as it pertains to identifying 
culpable individuals within an organization. 74  The overwhelming 
expansion of these governmental policies allows organizations that have 
effective compliance programs and skilled compliance officers on board 
to avoid significant penalties through a focus on deterrence, self-policing, 
and self-reporting, each of which are descriptive of some of the most 
fundamental components of the compliance function.75 As compliance 
roles continue to expand, new questions arise as to the regulation of the 
lawyers operating in such roles. 
II. THE REGULATION OF “LAW-RELATED SERVICES” 
A. The Practice of Law 
As a threshold matter, the inevitable question of whether lawyers 
operating in compliance roles are “practicing law” must be addressed. 
Although collective instinct may deem such work to be outside the realm 
of law practice, the title of lawyer, in itself, often leads constituents of an 
organization to believe, whether the case or not, that an attorney-client 
relationship has been formed. 76  As noted earlier, even the ABA’s 
Compliance Officer’s Deskbook acknowledges that a lawyer who is a 
compliance officer is likely to expect the substance of their work to be 
privileged,77 but it is necessary to be cognizant of the fine lines between 
law practice and law-related services, the latter of which may not 
                                                   
73 .  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CORPORATE WRONGDOING, 
(2015), https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download [https://perma.cc/M69Y-CSCQ] 
(the Yates Memo places a heavy focus on the importance of identification of all individuals involved 
in the misconduct).  
74. Catherine Greaves, DOJ Stresses Individual Accountability in New “Yates Memo”, A.B.A. 
(Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/publications/aba_health_esource/2015-
2016/october/yatesmemo.html [http://perma.cc/86Y5-MHZ2]. 
75. See, e.g., Todd Haugh, Nudging Corporate Compliance, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 683, 700 (2017) 
(defining compliance as a system of policies or processes aimed to deter violations of the law, 
regulations, or applicable norms); Sarah L. Stafford, Outsourcing Enforcement: Principles to Guide 
Self-Policing Regimes, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2293, 2297 (2011) (discussing the importance of 
voluntary self-policing as part of the compliance function). 
76. See Michele DeStefano, Creating A Culture of Compliance: Why Departmentalization May Not 
Be the Answer, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 71, 137 (2014) (quoting general counsel who oversee 
compliance roles stating that constituents of an organization view lawyers who are not in a role in 
which they are practicing law as lawyers, nonetheless, to be relied on for legal advice regardless of 
title). 
77. COMPLIANCE OFFICER’S DESKBOOK, supra note 11, at 124. 
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necessarily invoke the privilege or other coveted characteristics of an 
attorney-client relationship. 
The question of attorney-client privilege applicability is a crucial 
consideration for compliance work given its influence upon the 
individuals comprising the organization. If such persons know from the 
onset that the privilege applies, they are likely to share information with 
the lawyer much more freely. When the general counsel serves 
simultaneously as the compliance officer, it is often quite difficult for 
individuals to know whether or not the privilege applies.78 Attorney-client 
privilege applies to communications between an attorney and client when 
made for the purpose of obtaining an opinion of law, legal services, or 
assistance in a legal proceeding, and when made without the presence of 
strangers.79 The privilege applies only to situations in which the lawyer is 
providing “legal advice or services” and “will not protect disclosure of 
non-legal communications where the attorney acts as a business or 
economic advisor.”80 As courts have made clear, neither the attorney-
client privilege nor work-product protections apply to documents or 
communications produced as part of an internal investigation within an 
entity’s compliance department when that investigation was not 
conducted for the purpose of receiving or providing legal advice, prior to 
litigation emerging, or when a non-lawyer carrying out the investigation 
was not acting as the lawyer’s direct agent.81 
                                                   
78. See, e.g., Thomas O’Connor, When You Come to A Fork in the Road, Take It: Unifying the Split 
in New York’s Analysis of In-House Attorney-Client Privilege, 25 J.L. & POL’Y 437, 457 (2016) 
(noting the difficulty for the corporate client to determine whether communications at issue are legal 
in nature and subject to the attorney-client privilege when an attorney is simultaneously serving as a 
compliance officer).  
79. See Peterson v. Bernardi, 262 F.R.D. 424, 428 (D.N.J. 2009); Edwards v. Whitaker, 868 F. 
Supp. 226, 228 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) (citing Hydraflow, Inc. v. Enidine, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626, 630 
(W.D.N.Y.1993)). 
80. Whitaker, 868 F. Supp. at 228 (citing Hydraflow, 145 F.R.D. at 631); see also United States v. 
Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1202 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[E]ven though litigation is already in prospect, there 
is no work-product immunity for documents prepared in the regular course of business rather than for 
purposes of the litigation.” (quoting Charles A. Wright et al., 8 Fed. Prac. & Procedure § 2024, at 
346)); U.S. ex rel. Gale v. Omnicare, Inc., No. 1:10–CV–00127, 2013 WL 5525697, at *1 (N.D. Ohio 
Oct. 4, 2013) (finding that business communications made in business meetings when an attorney is 
present are not protected from disclosure). 
81 . See, e.g., Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 979 F. Supp. 2d 479, 495–96 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(“Privilege does not apply to an internal corporate investigation . . . made by management itself.” 
(internal citations omitted)); Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 273 F.R.D. 545, 557 (D. Ariz. 
2011) (determining that attorney-client privilege did not apply to the results of an investigation 
conducted by a compliance officer); Omnicare, 2013 WL 5525697, at *2 (holding that the attorney-
client privilege did not apply to documents drafted by a compliance officer just because general 
counsel and other attorneys may have also received these documents). But see In re Kellogg Brown 
& Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 758 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding privilege applied to communications 
between company employees and non-attorney investigators acting at the direction of counsel when 
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In at least one instance, a court denied application of the attorney-client 
privilege to communications made by constituents of an organization to a 
non-lawyer chief compliance officer conducting routine compliance 
work, even though the general counsel directly supervised the compliance 
department.82 Despite the attorney’s supervisory role over the compliance 
department, the court found that the privilege was still not applicable 
because the compliance officer was not preparing for a lawsuit or 
responding to legal claims or litigation at the time. 83  Therefore, the 
privilege is not likely to apply to most interactions with compliance 
officers who, in the course of their typical job duties, are not rendering 
legal advice or opinions or defending the company in a legal proceeding, 
all of which are actions that have traditionally described the “practice of 
law.”84 Rather, the compliance officer is monitoring and managing an 
organization’s behavior to avoid that these very actions ever 
become  necessary. 
Many scholars have acknowledged the significant difficulty of defining 
“the practice of law” in any concrete manner,85 especially as it pertains to 
rendering legal advice versus non-legal business or strategic advice86— a 
discrepancy that is especially relevant in the field of compliance. The 
Model Rules provide no definition of the “practice of law” and defer the 
matter completely to the individual states.87 Comment 2 to Model Rule 
5.5, which prohibits the unauthorized practice of law by non-lawyers, 
notes that the “definition of the practice of law is established by law and 
varies from one jurisdiction to another. Whatever the definition, limiting 
the practice of law to members of the bar protects the public against 
rendition of legal services by unqualified persons.”88 As is visible through 
this commentary, the ABA appears most concerned about the risk that a 
                                                   
the investigators were deemed “agents” of the attorney). 
82. Whitaker, 868 F. Supp. at 228.  
83. Id. 
84. See infra notes 89–91. 
85. See, e.g., DeStefano, supra note 8, at 2961–62 (noting, especially in the context of determining 
whether unauthorized practice of law statutes apply, the inability of the legal profession to define the 
practice of law); Brandon M. Meyers, Addressing the Boundaries of the Legal Profession’s Monopoly 
Through A Model Definition of the Practice of Law, 40 J. LEGAL PROF. 321, 325 (2016) (noting the 
absence of a clear definition of the practice of law); Deborah L. Rhode & Lucy B. Ricca, Protecting 
the Profession or the Public? Rethinking Unauthorized-Practice Enforcement, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2587, 2605 (2014) (noting the widespread lack of definition of the practice of law). 
86. DeStefano, supra note 8, at 2961–62 (noting that this distinction is “indeterminate”).  
87. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983); see also In re Pinkins, 213 
B.R. 818, 820 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 14, 1977) (“The formidable task of constructing a definition of the 
practice of law has largely been left to the judiciary.” (internal citations omitted)).  
88. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.5. cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (emphasis added).  
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non-attorney will perform responsibilities that could constitute the 
“practice of law,” rather than providing guidance as to how a clear 
definition is established. This lack of clarity is pertinent to compliance 
officers who are also lawyers, given the gray area in determining whether 
they are providing services that are legal in nature. 
Definitions of the practice of law across the fifty states are “consistently 
vague,” fact-specific, and extremely difficult to summarize into one 
description.89 Many judicial interpretations have expressed the inability to 
set forth a precise description of law practice, thereby making clear that 
questions on the topic must be decided on a case-by-case basis depending 
on the specific facts of the matter.90 For example, an Arkansas court stated 
that “[r]esearch of authorities by able counsel and by this court has failed 
to turn up any clear, comprehensible definition of what really constitutes 
the practice of law. Courts are not in agreement. We believe it is 
impossible to frame any comprehensive definition of what constitutes the 
practice of law.”91 A court in Florida held that: 
 Many courts have attempted to set forth a broad definition of the 
practice of law. Being of the view that such is nigh onto 
impossible and may injuriously affect the rights of others not here 
involved, we will not attempt to do so here. Rather we will do so 
only to the extent required to settle the issues of this case.92 
As these quotes reveal, state courts have tended to shy away from 
establishing a definition that could be widely applicable, thus deferring 
the question to some future determination where individual facts will be 
                                                   
89. Lauren Moxley, Zooming Past the Monopoly: A Consumer Rights Approach to Reforming the 
Lawyer’s Monopoly and Improving Access to Justice, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 553, 563 (2015); see 
also, e.g., Evan G. Zuckerman, Justicecorps: Helping Pro Se Litigants Bridge A Divide, 49 COLUM. 
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 551, 584 (2016) (discussing the variations among states in defining law practice); 
Victor Li, Talk to Me Issues Papers Seeking Feedback on How Legal Services Are Regulated Prompt 
Lots of Comments but Little Consensus, 102 A.B.A. J. 65, 66 (Sept. 2016) (discussing the extreme 
difficulty in defining what constitutes the practice of law).  
90 . See Anya E.R. Prince & Arlene M. Davis, Navigating Professional Norms in an Inter-
Professional Environment: The ‘Practice’ of Healthcare Ethics Committees, 15 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 
115, 139 (2016) (noting that states have “experienced difficulty” in creating rules to guide what is 
meant by the practice of law); Dru Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, Bargaining in the Shadow of 
Big Data, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1337, 1389 (2015) (discussing the lack of clarity as to how states define 
the practice of law). 
91. Ark. Bar Ass’n v. Block, 323 S.W.2d 912, 914 (1959) (concluding subsequently that each case 
presenting this issue must be decided based on its own facts).  
92. State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Sperry, 140 So.2d 587, 591 (Fla. 1962); see also State ex rel. Johnson 
v. Childe, 23 N.W.2d 720, 723 (Neb. 1946) (“An all inclusive definition of what constitutes the 
practice of law is too difficult for simple statement. We shall not attempt it here. . . .”). 
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analyzed. The existing state definitions are “not much more helpful than 
the standard for defining obscenity: we know it when we see it.”93 
The ABA has compiled a comparison of the fifty states’ definitions of 
the “practice of law,” which, upon examination, reveal that some common 
themes may be drawn from the various definitions—all such themes 
center around a litigation-focused approach in which client representation 
occurs in a tribunal-like or adversarial setting.94 Many state definitions 
focus heavily on adjudicative elements, defining law practice, most 
prominently, to include actions like appearing as an advocate; drawing 
papers or pleadings to enforce rights before a court or other entity as part 
of proceedings; preparing or drafting documents to enforce legal rights; 
or providing redress for a lack of rights or wrong committed.95 All of these 
actions imply that “law practice” constitutes a reactive response to a 
problem, rather than a preventative measure to avoid problems before 
they  occur. 
While some states have also acknowledged that the practice of law may 
be described more generally as providing advice or counsel on various 
subjects, none have included the monitoring, surveillance, and 
preventative measures that are typically descriptive of a compliance 
officer’s duties within their definitions.96 Rather, the “practice of law” 
tends to center on after-the-fact representation in which clients are in need 
of some type of advocacy because they have been sued or their rights have 
been violated in some way. While “practice of law” definitions fail to 
provide one consistent description, most states do converge on the 
requirement that the person providing the services is one specifically 
trained or knowledgeable in the law; operates in a representative capacity 
to enforce or defend another’s rights with skilled, legal knowledge;97 or 
                                                   
93. Andrew M. Perlman, Towards the Law of Legal Services, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 49, 88–89 (2015).  
94. A.B.A., State Definitions of the Practice of 
Law,   https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professionalresponsibility/mod
el-def_migrated/model_def_statutes.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QZA-HLWP] 
[hereinafter  A.B.A., State Definitions]; see also Bruce A. Green, The Litigator’s Monopoly, 40 
A.B.A. Litig. 10 (Summer 2014) (discussing that there are ambiguities as to what 
professional  services are “legal services” versus the “practice of law” for purposes of unauthorized 
practice of law statutes and noting that, despite the lack of clarity, “it has long been assumed that if 
any one service constitutes the practice of law and is therefore off-limits to non-lawyers, it 
is  litigation.”).                     
95. A.B.A., State Definitions, supra note 94 (citing the various state adaptations of the definition 
of the practice of law); see also Moxley, supra note 89, at 563 (noting that a comparative analysis of 
the various state definitions have summarized the following duties as most comprehensive in outlining 
what comprises the practice of law: directing and managing the enforcement of legal rights or legal 
claims, giving or offering legal advice as to such enforcement, rendering opinions, and drafting 
documents “by which such rights are created, modified, surrendered or secured . . . .”).  
96. A.B.A., State Definitions, supra note 94. 
97. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 08.08.230 (R. 63) (2019); Denver Bar Ass’n v. Public Utilities 
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possesses the “professional judgment of a lawyer.”98 The ABA has also 
attempted to set forth that “functionally the practice of law ‘relates to the 
rendition of services for others that call for the professional judgment of 
a lawyer.”‘99 
In light of the uncertainty of defining the practice of law and the general 
consensus among states that, at a minimum, possession of specialized, 
legal knowledge or judgment is required, it is a reasonable conclusion that 
the work of a compliance officer or a person engaged in the compliance 
function does not fit squarely into the “practice of law” for purposes of 
triggering adherence to all of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional 
Responsibility. This is the case because compliance officers are not 
necessarily trained in law. As previously noted, such individuals need not 
possess a J.D. or a law license. While possession of a J.D. may be an 
advantage, it is not a requirement for the job.100 Further, the definitions of 
law practice among the states have in common a focus on litigation-
related activities, whether the drafting of pleadings, advocacy, or 
representation in an adjudicative setting.101 Such activities are not on par 
with the work of a compliance officer, which is focused on organizational 
monitoring for red flags to ensure, well in advance of actual violations, 
                                                   
Comm’n, 391 P.2d 467, 471 (Colo. 1964) (“We believe that generally one who acts in a representative 
capacity in protecting, enforcing, or defending the legal rights and duties of another and in counseling, 
advising and assisting him in connection with these rights and duties is engaged in the practice of law 
[in Colorado].”); Fink v. Peden, 17 N.E.2d 95, 96 (Ind. 1938) (noting that, in Indiana, the “practice 
of law” “is to carry on the business of an attorney at law . . .  to exercise the calling or profession of 
the law.”); KY. REV. STAT. § SCR 3.020 (2020); LA. REV. STAT. § 37: 212 (2012); In re Welch, 185 
A.2d 458, 459 (Vt. 1962) (“In general, one is deemed to be practicing law whenever he furnishes to 
another advice or service under circumstances which imply the possession and use of legal knowledge 
and skill.”). 
98. See, e.g., N.H. SUP. CT. r. 35 (defining law practice as that which requires the “professional 
judgment of a lawyer,” which is defined as the “educated ability to relate the general body and 
philosophy of law to a specific legal problem of a client”); IOWA CODE PROF’L RESP. EC 3-5; State 
ex rel. Florida Bar v. Sperry, 140 So.2d 587, 591 (Fla. 1962) (noting that those engaged in law practice 
“ possess legal skill and a knowledge of the law greater than that possessed by the average citizen”); 
R. J. Edwards, Inc. v. Hert, 504 P.2d 407, 416 (Okla. 1972) (defining the practice of law in Kansas as 
“the rendition of services requiring the knowledge and application of legal principles and technique 
to serve the interests of another with his consent”); In re Discipio, 645 N.E.2d 906, 910 (Ill. 1994) 
(“The focus of the inquiry must be on whether the activity in question required legal knowledge and 
skill in order to apply legal principles and precedent.”); State v. Rogers, 705 A.2d 397, 400 (N.J. App. 
Div. 1998) (“The practice of law is not ‘limited to the conduct of cases in court but is engaged in 
whenever and wherever legal knowledge, training, skill, and ability are required.’” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
99 . A.B.A. Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1311 (Mar. 11, 1975) 
(internal citations omitted). 
100. See supra section I.A.  
101. See supra notes 95–99. 
 
15 Pacella.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/31/20  12:08 AM 
2020] THE REGULATION OF LAWYERS IN COMPLIANCE 969 
 
that an entity is conforming its behavior to the expectations of the 
appropriate governing regulatory agency. 
As discussed, in many cases, a compliance officer, in conjunction with 
the organization, would opt to self-report the non-conformities to the 
government for cooperation credit or to work in tandem with the agency 
to establish a compliance remediation plan.102 Each of these activities, 
especially the self-reporting, diverge from the traditional role of attorneys 
that still largely comprise the various state definitions of law practice. For 
these reasons, compliance work that does not overlap with the general 
counsel function is not likely to fit squarely within services that constitute 
the “practice of law.” The next logical inquiry, then, is whether a better fit 
for compliance constitutes “law-related services,” which, if deemed 
applicable, would trigger full adherence to the professional rules of 
conduct pursuant to ABA Model Rule 5.7.103 
B. Rule 5.7 
One study, which consisted of interviews with seventy compliance 
officers and general counsels of S&P 500 corporations across different 
industries, revealed that most of the individuals within those entities 
perceived compliance officers, whether trained in the law or not, as being 
involved with interpreting the law in some way or offering advice that 
may be legally related.104 As various interviewees expressed, “you often 
face . . . compliance officers giving legal advice—and it’s hard for them 
not to do it sometimes, given the nature and scope of their jobs . . . . ” and 
“internal clients, and even lawyers working within the legal department 
itself, sometimes believe that they can receive (or are receiving) legal 
advice from the compliance officer.” 105  The compliance officers 
interviewed who hold no law degree or law license also expressed that 
their job largely consists of reading and interpreting the law or regulations 
that are on point to guide their monitoring of the entity, which involves 
researching and interpreting legal precedent for guidance.106 As such, it is 
often not clear where legal work ends and compliance duties begin. 
                                                   
102. See supra section I.B.  
103. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).  
104. DeStefano, supra note 8, at 2977; see also James Fanto, Dashboard Compliance: Benefit, 
Threat, or Both?, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L 1, 7 (2016) (noting that “compliance officers 
are specialists in legal obligations” and also contribute greatly to the ethical climate and culture of the 
institution).  
105. DeStefano, supra note 8, at 2977 (emphasis added) (quoting various interviewees).  
106. Id. at 2978.  
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As explained in the previous section, while it is not a precise fit to 
define compliance work as the “practice of law,” at a minimum, a lawyer 
in a compliance role is very likely to render services that would be “law-
related” given the broad definition of how such services are defined.107 
Accordingly, ABA’s Model Rule 5.7, “Responsibilities Regarding Law-
related Services,” would be triggered, which prompts adherence to the full 
range of ethical rules even when the services provided are non-legal. Rule 
5.7 rule reads in full as follows: 
a) A lawyer shall be subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct 
with respect to the provision of law-related services, as defined in 
paragraph (b), if the law-related services are provided: 
(1) by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the 
lawyer’s provision of legal services to clients; or 
(2) in other circumstances by an entity controlled by the lawyer 
individually or with others if the lawyer fails to take reasonable 
measures to assure that a person obtaining the law-related 
services knows that the services are not legal services and that the 
protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not exist. 
(b) The term “law-related services” denotes services that might 
reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are 
related to the provision of legal services, and that are not 
prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided by a 
non-lawyer.108 
The definition of “law-related services” is very much on point to 
describe the compliance function. Commentary to the rule elaborates that 
“law-related services” would exist in a “broad range of economic and 
other interests of clients,” with enumerated examples including 
“providing title insurance, financial planning, accounting, trust services, 
real estate counseling, legislative lobbying, economic analysis, social 
work, psychological counseling, tax preparation, and patent, medical or 
environmental consulting.” 109  Given the expansiveness of this 
commentary and the definition itself, it is reasonable to argue that 
compliance work is, at a minimum, descriptive of the services listed 
above. A compliance officer’s work largely consists of interpreting 
applicable law, regulations, and statutes, and monitoring the organization 
for conformity with these mandates through compliance programs, 
advice, internal reporting systems, and the encouragement of ethical 
                                                   
107. Id. at 2979 (noting that the following law-related services may be included in the corporate 
compliance context: public relations, banking, financial, or accounting services).  
108. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (emphasis added).  
109. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7. cmt. 9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).  
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practices—all constituting services that are very likely to “reasonably be 
performed in conjunction with and in substance are related to” legal 
services.110 Compliance services are substantively related to legal services 
not only because an entity’s legal and compliance functions must be in 
sync to ensure appropriate remediation of any violations, 111  but also 
because it is ultimately the law itself that dictates whether an organization 
has complied with the regulations incumbent upon it and whether its 
compliance program is effective. Simply put, one must know the laws and 
regulations in substance to ensure compliance with them. 
In addition, it is significant that the definition of law-related services 
includes a requirement that the services being offered “are not prohibited 
as unauthorized practice of law when provided by a non-lawyer.” 112 
Therefore, the services must actually comprise those that may lawfully be 
carried out by non-legal laypersons without any argument that such 
persons are committing an unauthorized practice of law.113 As discussed, 
there is absolutely no requirement that a compliance officer be an 
attorney—a law degree or law license, while desirable in the current era, 
have never been prerequisites to employment qualification. For these 
reasons, it is reasonable to conclude that the compliance function fits 
squarely within the realm of what would constitute law-related services, 
thereby prompting adherence to Rule 5.7. 
Subsection (1) of the rule triggers the application of all of the 
professional rules of conduct when a lawyer provides law-related services 
that are so intertwined with the legal services being rendered that the two 
are indistinguishable from each other, which often occurs when the lawyer 
is providing both types of services with respect to the same matter.114 As 
this part of the rule guards against, when the two types of services are 
indistinguishable in this way, it is reasonable for the recipient to 
mistakenly believe that all of the various protections of the attorney-client 
relationship are being afforded, including a duty of confidentiality, 
prohibitions against conflicts of interest, and, if applicable, the existence 
of attorney-client privilege.115 
                                                   
110. See supra section I.A.  
111. See infra note 181.  
112. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).  
113. Unauthorized practice of law statutes, which have been adopted in some form by all of the states, 
bar prohibit non-lawyers from providing legal services and practicing law. See generally David G. Ebner, 
Crossing the Border: Issues in the Multistate Practice of Law, ROCKY MT. MINERAL L. SPEC. INST. 
(1988); DeStefano, supra note 8, at 2961 (discussing unauthorized practice of law statutes). 
114. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
115. See id. at cmt. 1; PHILA. BAR ASS’N, Ethics Op. 2003-16 (2004) (discussing the situations that 
Rule 5.7 is intended to cover).  
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This type of scenario is most likely to play out when a lawyer wears 
the dual hat of compliance officer and general counsel and is thus 
providing both legal and law-related services at the same time. As 
examined earlier in this section, it may prove to be impossible to 
distinguish between legal and law-related services in this context, and 
result in significant confusion for organizational clients to know whether 
an attorney-client relationship exists in all settings.116  Therefore, it is 
reasonable, per Rule 5.7, to expect a joint general counsel/compliance 
officer to follow the full spectrum of attorney professional conduct rules 
for both types of services. 
In circumstances where the legal and law-related services are distinct 
from each other, however, subsection (2) is applicable. The crux of this 
subsection is to trigger adherence to the full set of professional conduct 
rules in all other circumstances not captured by subsection (1).117 As such, 
the coverage of this rule is much broader than it initially appears on its 
face to apply to the services rendered by “entities” that are controlled by 
lawyers. 118  This situation is most likely to occur when the chief 
compliance officer of an organization is not simultaneously the general 
counsel, or operates within a separate department from that of 
legal  counsel. 
Rule 5.7 was developed in the early 1990s in response to efforts by law 
firms to relax restrictions on lawyers sharing fees with non-lawyers and 
to regulate lawyers engaging in ancillary businesses or creating 
multidisciplinary practice arrangements with other professionals like 
accountants, engineers, social workers, or medical experts.119 While Rule 
5.7’s original aim was to ensure that lawyers engaged in ancillary 
businesses or business ventures with non-lawyers would still be held to 
ethical rules for their non-legal services if the client failed to understand 
that there was no attorney-client relationship for those services,120 the 
modern interpretation of this rule is much broader and extends to lawyers 
                                                   
116. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).  
117. Id.;  see also infra note 118 and accompanying text.  
118. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7(a)(2) cmt. 4. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983); Spitzer, supra 
note 20, at 6, 50. 
119. See Roberta S. Karmel, Will Law Firms Go Public?, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 487, 498 (2013) 
(noting that New York adopted Rule 5.7 in light of the recognition that law firms often provide non-
legal services that may be difficult to distinguish from legal services); Spitzer, supra note 20, at 50–
52 (discussing the history of Rule  5.7). 
120. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING, 51:02, 51–54 (4th ed., 
2015); Spitzer, supra note 20, at 50 (discussing the history of the ABA as it pertains to the 
development of this rule).  
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in any setting who provide law-related services that laypersons may 
also  perform.121 
Application of the rule in this manner was solidified by the ABA’s 
House of Delegates Ethics 2000 Commission, which amended some 
Model Rules and broadened Rule 5.7’s scope specifically to apply to all 
circumstances not covered by subsection (1), which captures all instances 
in which a lawyer provides law-related services that are distinct from legal 
services.122 The Commission explained that the change in interpretation 
was needed to “eliminate[] an unintended gap in the coverage of the 
Model Rule” and “precludes an overly restrictive reading of paragraph 
(a)(1) to the effect that the provision of law-related services could never 
be distinct from the provision of legal services if directly provided by a 
lawyer or law firm.”123 This extensive reach of Rule 5.7, however, is 
reined in by an exception providing an “out” articulated in subsection (2), 
which allows lawyers to avoid being subject to the full span of 
professional conduct rules if they take “reasonable measures” to inform 
the recipient of the law-related services that such services are not legal in 
nature and that the protective benefits of an attorney-client relationship 
will not be triggered.124 This provision has been described as a “consumer 
and public protection regulation . . . meant to protect non-legally trained 
individuals from being taken advantage of by lawyers.”125 
Most state jurisdictions have adopted Rule 5.7 as it is currently 
written.126 The following fifteen states have not adopted Rule 5.7 in any 
form: Alabama, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Texas, 
Virginia, and Wyoming.127 The following states have adopted the same 
language that is set forth in the ABA’s Model Rule 5.7: Arizona, 
                                                   
121. Spitzer, supra note 20, at 62 (discussing the applicability of the rule to all lawyers providing 
“law-like activities” that may also be provided by non-lawyers).  
122. Ethics 2000 Commission, MODEL RULE 5.7, REPORTER’S EXPLANATION OF CHANGES, AM. 
BAR ASS’N., https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_c
ommission/e2k_rule57rem/ [https://perma.cc/4TXV-8WRE]; see also Spitzer, supra note 20, at 62–
63 (discussing the broad application of Rule 5.7). 
123. Ethics 2000 Commission, supra note 122. 
124. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
125. Spitzer, supra note 20, at 55. 
126. See infra notes 127–128. 
127. See ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; CONN. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT; HAW. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; KY. RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT; LA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; MONT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; NEV. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; OR. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; and 
TEX. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (each lacking some version of Model Rule 5.7).  
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Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia,128 Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and 
Washington, D.C.129 
New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, however, have each made some 
noteworthy variations to their versions of the rule. New York’s Rule 5.7 
uses the term “nonlegal services” rather than “law-related services,” 
which is defined as “those services that lawyers may lawfully provide and 
that are not prohibited as an unauthorized practice of law when provided 
by a nonlawyer.”130 In contrast, the ABA version of the rule contains a 
reasonability requirement to determine the meaning of “law-related 
services,” defining such services as those “that might reasonably be 
performed in conjunction with and in substance are related to the 
provision of legal services.”131 New York’s adaptation thereby renders the 
universe of services subject to this rule broader than those covered by the 
Model Rules given that it encompasses nearly all services in which any 
non-lawyer may also engage. Subsection (2) of the New York rule also 
differs from Model Rule 5.7 in two important respects, and reads as 
follows: 
A lawyer or law firm that provides nonlegal services to a person 
that are distinct from legal services being provided to that person 
by the lawyer or law firm is subject to these Rules with respect to 
the nonlegal services if the person receiving the services could 
                                                   
128. The language of Georgia’s Rule 5.7 is the same as that of the ABA version except that it adds 
the following sentence at the end of the rule to limit the maximum penalty for lawyers who fail to 
comply with the rule: “The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand.” See 
GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7. 
129. See ARIZ. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; ARK. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; COLO. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; DEL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; GA. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 5.7; HAW. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; IDAHO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; 
IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; IOWA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; KAN. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; ME. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; MD. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 
5.7; MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; MICH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; MINN. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; MO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; NEB. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 5.7; N.H. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; N.M. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; 
N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; OKLA. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; R.I. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; S.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 
5.7; S.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; TENN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; UTAH RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; VT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; WASH. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 5.7; W. VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; WIS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; 
D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7. 
130. N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7(c). 
131. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
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reasonably believe that the nonlegal services are the subject of a 
client-lawyer relationship.132 
The first difference is that New York’s version prioritizes client 
interpretation, rather than a lawyer’s directive, to determine whether the 
protections of the attorney-client relationship will be triggered. This 
determination is based on the client’s “reasonabl[e] belie[f]” as to whether 
such a relationship was formed,133 rather than any action taken by the 
lawyer to inform the client otherwise. Like use of the term “nonlegal 
services,”134 such language has the effect of broadening the reach of the 
rule to require lawyers to follow all of the professional rules in the course 
of their compliance work. 
Second, the above language makes clear that the available “out” 
(although harder to achieve through the New York rule since it is based 
on the reasonable belief of the recipient of the services) is not limited to 
the context of services provided by “entities,” but also captures individual 
lawyers. The advantage of such language over the current form of ABA’s 
Model Rule 5.7 is that it is clearly stated in the rule and allows an 
individual lawyer who is providing non-legal services that are distinct 
from legal services to have a mechanism for avoiding the full application 
of the professional rules. Although the reach of ABA’s Model Rule 5.7 is 
intended to have the same result after the clarifications of the Ethics 2000 
Commission discussed earlier,135 the fact that current subsection (2) fails 
to explicitly name individual lawyers creates the potential for confusion 
as to whether a lawyer falling in this category may avoid the full 
application of the rules by using “reasonable measures” to inform the 
recipient that the services are not legal. One scholar has expressed that the 
drafting of subsection (2), in referring only to “entities,” was an oversight 
and should be treated as such.136 
Further, the “out” available in the New York rule is expanded upon 
through an additional subsection stating the following: 
[I]t will be presumed that the person receiving non-legal services 
believes the services to be the subject of a client-lawyer 
relationship unless the lawyer or law firm has advised the person 
receiving the services in writing that the services are not legal 
services and that the protection of a client-lawyer relationship 
does not exist with respect to the non-legal services. . . . 137 
                                                   
132. N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7(a)(2). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. See supra notes 122–123.  
136. Spitzer, supra note 20, at 63. 
137. N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7(a)(4) (emphasis added). 
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While, at first glance, the presumption described here may create 
concerns of expanded liability for lawyers because it would automatically 
create an attorney-client relationship if no action is taken by the lawyer, it 
provides the benefit of making absolutely clear (unlike Model Rule 5.7, 
which uses the term “reasonable measures”) exactly what a New York 
lawyer must do to avoid application of the presumption. In this way, New 
York lawyers providing non-legal services are called upon to take clearly 
articulated steps from the onset, in the form of a writing, to avoid any 
confusion as to the nature of the services being provided. 
Pennsylvania’s Rule 5.7, similar to that of New York, also uses the term 
“nonlegal services” rather than “law-related services,” but defines it in the 
same manner as Model Rule 5.7.138 Its equivalent of subsection (2) is also 
similar to that of New York in that it captures both lawyers who own or 
control ancillary businesses and those who do not in having an “out” from 
full application of the ethical rules.139 In this case, adherence to the ethical 
rules is triggered “if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the 
recipient might believe that the recipient is receiving the protection of a 
client-lawyer relationship.”140  Thus, Pennsylvania’s rule is more of a 
middle road between that of Model Rule 5.7, which is focused on a lawyer 
taking “reasonable measures,” and New York’s Rule 5.7, which is client-
focused. The Pennsylvania rule then proceeds to excuse lawyers from full 
adherence to the ethical rules if they have made “reasonable efforts to 
avoid any misunderstanding by the recipient receiving nonlegal 
services.”141 Such “efforts must include advising the recipient that the 
services are not legal services and that the protection of a client-lawyer 
relationship does not exist with respect to the provision of nonlegal 
services to the recipient.”142 Therefore, this rule provides for a similar 
disclosure requirement as that of New York, but lacks the requirement that 
it be in writing. 
In response to an inquiry from a general counsel of a corporation who 
was being asked to make a non-legal business decision for the company, 
a Philadelphia Bar Association Advisory Opinion advised that its Rule 5.7 
applies in this exact situation and that the lawyer “has a duty” to the client 
to (a) clearly explain when and how attorney-client privilege would apply; 
                                                   
138. PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7(e). “Non-legal services” in Pennsylvania are defined as 
“services that might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are related to the 
provision of legal services, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided 
by a nonlawyer.” Id. 
139. Id. r. 5.7(b), (c). 
140. Id. r. 5.7(c). 
141. Id. r. 5.7(d). 
142. Id. 
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(b) clearly explain that certain communications in this context may not be 
privileged; and (c) articulate which non-legal services are so distinct from 
legal services that the protections of the rules of professional conduct may 
not apply.143 This letter emphasized the sheer importance of informing the 
client of these facts in advance, since any work done by the in-house 
counsel, whether non-legal or legal, “will have the imprimatur of being 
done by an attorney, and thus could be subject by others who scrutinize 
her conduct to the expectation that the highest ethical standards apply to 
all of her company functions.”144 
 
Finally, Ohio’s version of Rule 5.7 requires an additional mandate for 
a lawyer “who controls or owns an interest in a business that provides a 
law-related service,” barring lawyers from “requir[ing] any customer of 
that business to agree to legal representation by the lawyer as a condition 
of the engagement of that business.”145 In such instances, lawyers must 
disclose their interest in the business to any such customers and inform 
them that they are free to “obtain legal services elsewhere. . . . ”146 In this 
way, the rule ensures (a) that a lawyer operating an ancillary business will 
not induce already-existing customers receiving non-legal services from 
the business to continue to work with the lawyer if legal services are later 
needed; and (b) vice-versa—that an existing client of a lawyer receiving 
legal services need not utilize the lawyer’s ancillary business if any non-
legal services are desired. 
In summary, New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio have each included 
on the face of the rule itself some form of disclosure obligation involving 
affirmative steps that the lawyer must take to ensure, from the onset, that 
it is absolutely clear that the law-related or non-legal services being 
provided do not carry with them all of the protections of a typical attorney-
client relationship. In turn, the lawyer is able to avoid the full application 
of the professional rules to their non-legal services. In the context of the 
compliance function, this type of clarity is especially crucial given that 
full application of the professional rules would result in exceedingly 
complex and sometimes impossible expectations on the part of the non-
practicing compliance lawyer given that such work does not fit squarely 
into the types of rules that were created to govern the “practice of law.” 
As a result, lawyers in such positions become subject to considerable 
personal liability. These concerns will be addressed next. 
                                                   
143. PHILA. BAR ASS’N, Advisory Op. 2008-8 (Oct. 2008).  
144. Id. 
145. OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7(b), (c). 
146. Id. r. 5.7(b). 
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III. LIABILITY CONCERNS FOR LAWYERS IN COMPLIANCE 
A. Imprecise Fit of Professional Conduct Rules 
When compliance officers who are also lawyers become subject to the 
full span of professional conduct rules, they also become susceptible to 
heightened personal liability and potential disciplinary action by their 
respective jurisdictions for risk of violating one of the many ethical rules 
that are not a perfect fit for the non-legal, compliance work that they 
provide. There are several examples of professional conduct rules that 
would create unique difficulties to ensure that the rule is properly 
followed by compliance officers who, although may be admitted to the 
bar and answerable to their respective jurisdiction of admission, are 
neither serving in a general counsel role nor practicing law. 
For example, Model Rule 1.1 requires a lawyer to represent a client 
competently, defined as “requir[ing] the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation.”147  To ensure adherence to this rule, lawyers who are 
functioning as compliance officers described above must possess the 
requisite knowledge and skill pertaining to the applicable regulatory 
scheme that governs the industry in which their organization is operating, 
which may prove to be a very difficult task because of the extensive 
breadth and depth of the regulations in question, both at the state and 
federal level.148 In addition, lawyers would need to constantly monitor 
their shortcomings as they pertain to competency issues and, if necessary, 
“refer the matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer of established 
competence in the field in question.” 149  This requirement may be 
problematic in the types of organizational settings in which compliance 
officers or compliance departments exist, as opposed to a law firm or legal 
                                                   
147. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). In determining whether 
competency exists, the commentary to the rule lists various factors to be considered, including:  
The relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer’s general experience, 
the lawyer’s training and experience in the field in question, the preparation and study the lawyer 
is able to give the matter and whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or consult 
with, a lawyer of established competence in the field in question. Id. cmt. 1. 
148. See William W. Horton, When Two Worlds Collide: Ethics Challenges in the Compliance 
Officer-General Counsel Relationship, JONES WALKER LLP (Dec. 2015), 
https://kipdf.com/queue/when-two-worlds-collide-ethics-challenges-in-the-compliance-officer-
general-coun_5acbb1197f8b9aeb918b45a8.html [https://perma.cc/AEV2-Z4AW] (discussing how 
ensuring competency creates potential concerns for joint lawyers/compliance officers working in the 
healthcare compliance arena). 
149. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
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department where others with varying specializations may be readily 
available for reference.150 
In addition, the rules pertaining to the disclosure of confidential 
information in Model Rule 1.6 and to conflicts of interest in Model Rules 
1.7 to 1.11 are of particular concern to a joint lawyer/compliance 
officer.151 Pursuant to Rule 1.6, lawyers must maintain client confidences, 
which the ABA deems a “fundamental principle” that “contributes to the 
trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship.”152 Various 
exceptions allow lawyers to reveal confidential information when they 
reasonably believe necessary to prevent severe instances such as death, 
bodily harm, crimes and frauds, and other permitted circumstances.153 
Lawyers held to this rule in the compliance context must be particularly 
cognizant of its limitations, especially given their duties to report the 
organization’s compliance violations to the board of directors or the 
applicable regulator. If this rule were to apply to their compliance work, 
they would need to be careful to argue that an external report fits one of 
the exceptions to the rule permitting disclosure, which is not likely to be 
the case when the report is being made preemptively to a regulator to 
timely address an early-stage red flag.154 
Further, Model Rules 1.7 through 1.9 each bar a lawyer from 
representing clients if doing so would involve a conflict of interest, 
whether posing a conflict with current or future clients (Rules 1.7 and 1.9, 
respectively), or where a lawyer acquires an interest that is adverse to the 
client (Rule 1.8).155 Rule 1.8 is likely to emerge as a greater concern for 
compliance officers in the context of compensation issues. When a 
compliance officer’s compensation structure is based on the business 
line’s financial performance, this could create a conflict of interest and 
                                                   
150. See Horton, supra note 148 (noting that certain compliance-related skills, specifically in the 
healthcare sector, may involve technical billing and coding, medical necessity, or cost report issues, 
which tend to be out of the purview of the lawyer/compliance officer). 
151. Comment 10 to Model Rule 5.7 highlights these rules as being particularly important when a 
lawyer rendering law-related services is obliged to adhere to the full set of ethical rules. See MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
   152. Id. r. 1.6 cmt. 2. 
153. Id. r. 1.6(b).  
154. John B. McNeece, IV, The Ethical Conflicts of the Hybrid General Counsel and Chief 
Compliance Officer, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 677, 678 (2012); see also DeStefano, supra note 8, at 
124 (discussing how the “rules and standards regulating lawyers” differentiate them from compliance 
officers with respect to self-reporting); Preserving Confidentiality, 12 ACCA DOCKET, no. 1, Winter 
1994, at 24, 44 (noting that a compliance officer’s failure to report may result in a complicit 
individual being subject to prosecution, whereas a lawyer has an obligation to maintain confidentiality 
in such situations).  
155. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10, and 1.11 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).  
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undermine the independence of the compliance function.156 Although an 
October 2008 letter issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve advised that compensation and incentive programs for 
compliance staff should not be based on financial business performance 
to avoid these types of conflicts, a recent survey of compliance staff 
compensation by the National Regulatory Services revealed that sixty 
percent of the respondents do participate in some type of incentive 
compensation program.157 Such concerns are especially prevalent in the 
financial services industry, in which incentive compensation through 
annual bonuses may have the effect of doubling or tripling one’s base 
income.158 
In addition to the potential conflict stemming from compensation-
based issues, a compliance officer’s direct reporting line may also pose a 
conflict of interest concern. It is commonly argued that the board of 
directors should have oversight over compliance officers with respect to 
hiring, compensation, and termination, and that compliance officers 
should report directly to the board rather than to officers or general 
counsel.159 Yet in many cases, the executive officers have control over 
compliance officers and receive their reports.160 This situation could lead 
to a conflict of interest given that there are times when the compliance 
officer’s position might contrast with the wishes or desired direction of 
management, thereby resulting in intense pressures for the compliance 
officer to succumb to the pressures of management to avoid threats to job 
security.161 In fact, various instances of compliance officers opting to 
                                                   
156. See Vishal Melwani, Refining Compliance Within Large Banking Organizations in a Post SR 
08-8 World, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 615, 622 (2015) (discussing this potential conflict and 
acknowledging the inherent contradiction it poses: “how can compliance staff be compensated if not 
for the performance of the business line that contributes to the firm’s bottom line?”); Aruna 
Viswanatha & Brett Wolf, Wall Street’s Hot Hire: Anti-Money Laundering Compliance 
Officers, REUTERS FIN. REG. FORUM (Oct. 14, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-
forum/2013/10/14/wall-streets-hot-hire-anti-money-laundering-compliance-officers/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZZ2S-WFPP] (discussing the rapid increase in compliance jobs and increased 
compensation). 
157. See Melwani, supra note 156, at 622–23 (noting that the data presented through this survey, 
although differing depending on the compensation structure, revealed that on average incentive 
compensation is typically 20% to 30% of base compensation but can even reach 100% of base 
compensation). 
158. See id. (noting that the data presented through this survey, although differing depending on 
the compensation structure, revealed that on average incentive compensation is typically 20% to 30% 
of base compensation but can even reach 100% of base compensation). 
159 . See, e.g., Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate 
Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679, 694 (2009). 
160. Id. at 693. 
161. Id. at 693–94. 
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forego an investigation due to pressure from management have been 
reported.162 
B. Inherent Tension Between Law Practice & Compliance Work 
Given that the requirements of Rule 5.7 differ based on whether law-
related services are being provided in circumstances that are distinct from 
the lawyer’s provision of legal services, one way to minimize potential 
liability is to clearly separate the legal and compliance departments within 
an organization. There has been extensive scholarly debate as to whether 
an organization’s legal and compliance functions should be 
departmentalized, or operate as separate units, from each other.163 Various 
corporate scandals occurring over the last two decades, and spanning 
multiple industries, have prompted regulators to favor the separation of 
the two functions.164 In particular, the SEC and the Department of Health 
and Human Services have each required corporations that have engaged 
in wrongdoing to both establish stand-alone compliance departments, and 
appoint a chief compliance officer who reports directly to the board of 
directors, rather than to the general counsel.165  Regulators commonly 
believe that a compliance department that is separate from the legal 
function will allow more autonomy and independence to the former to 
discover, report, and manage instances of non-compliance because 
general counsel would not have a chance to filter or safeguard the 
information before it reaches the board of directors.166 This regulatory 
preference towards separation of the two functions is also telling of the 
inherent differences between a compliance officer and an attorney, 
especially pertaining to the relationship of these individuals with the 
organization itself and with regulators; in essence, the compliance officer 
represents the regulator, rather than the organization that it monitors.167 
                                                   
162. Id. (also noting claims of compliance officers losing their jobs after deciding to resist orders 
from management). 
163 . See, e.g., DeStefano, supra note 8, at 124 (explaining the arguments for and against 
departmentalization); Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-House Lawyers, 
Enterprise Risk, and the Financial Crisis, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 495, 500 (2012) (discussing the “robust 
debate” as to whether compliance professionals should operate separately from legal counsel). 
164. DeStefano, supra note 8, at 73–74 (noting that the trend of separating the two functions).  
165. Id. at 74–75. 
166. Id. at 124; see also Langevoort, supra note 163, at 500 (discussing how this influences 
“professional competition” between lawyers and compliance officers). In addition, separation may 
also allow the compliance industry as a whole to gain increased status in the corporate arena given 
that it is not controlled by the legal function. See id.  
167. See Fanto, supra note 104, at 5 (discussing the role of the compliance officer as guardians of 
regulatory and other obligations who design policies and procedures to ensure that the organization 
meets these external requirements).  
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In society and in professional culture, lawyers tend to be perceived as 
trusted, revered confidants and advisors offering a level of trust to clients 
that would be unparalleled in other settings.168 This level of trust, inherent 
in the various duties of loyalty and confidentiality that every attorney is 
called to uphold, is likely to be in tension with that of the fundamental 
role of a compliance officer, as compliance officers are commonly 
perceived as either regulators themselves or as agents of regulators that 
police entities to ensure rules are being followed. 169  In contrast, the 
general counsel has a much more protective role over the organization and 
is likely to have a more adversarial relationship with the regulator in 
defending the entity against litigation or shielding it from liability.170 
Various scholars and practitioners have also noted the tendency to 
perceive lawyers as possessing a certain “cast of mind” or exercising more 
“strategy” than compliance officers so that the wishes of the client may 
be followed, even if that may mean finding loopholes in the law. 171 
Studies have revealed that lawyers, specifically when in charge of 
compliance, are more likely than compliance officers “to lead their 
organizations into a game-playing posture.”172 As one scholar put it, in 
some cases, lawyers, particularly in-house counsel, may become subject 
to a sort of “ethical numbing,” thereby leading the lawyer to adopt “the 
same occupational morality as the managers with whom they work, 
                                                   
168. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice: Their 
Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values Debate, 84 MINN. L. 
REV. 1115, 1116 (2000) (noting that “basic principles of loyalty, competence and confidentiality” are 
“defining principles for the practice of law [and] among the core values of the legal profession”); 
State ex rel. S.G., 814 A.2d 612, 617 (N.J. 2003); Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 SW.2d 543 (Tex. 
1998) (each noting the almost sacred bond between attorney and client); Seth Rosner, The 
Consigliere, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 191, 193 (1995) (describing a lawyer as “consigliere, or 
counselor in the broadest professional sense,” the “old-fashioned . . . trusted advisor”); Edward J. 
Greenfield, former Justice of the Supreme Court of New York, Letter to the Forum, Attorney 
Professionalism Forum, 76 N.Y. ST. B. A. J., Jan. 2004, at 48 (2005) (noting that the lawyer’s position 
is one “of trust as counsel, confidant, champion and fiduciary” (quoting Sanders v. Rosen, 605 
N.Y.S.2d 805, 808 (Sup. Ct. 1993)).  
169. MILLER, supra note 28, at 130 (comparing a compliance officer to “a beat cop walking the 
corridors of the company’s organization chart to ensure that rules and regulations are being 
followed.”); see also DeStefano, supra note 8, at 122–23 (describing that proponents of 
departmentalization have argued that doing so results in more independence and autonomy of the 
compliance officer); McNeece, IV, supra note 154, at 677–78 (noting the inherent tensions in external 
reporting that exist when the general counsel also serves as the compliance officer, the latter of which 
has duties to report compliance obligations). 
170. MILLER, supra note 28, at 127–28 (noting that, despite these differences, the general counsel 
will usually still have input in a company’s response to the detection of a legal violation).   
171. DeStefano, supra note 8, at 135–36. 
172. See Christine E. Parker et al., The Two Faces of Lawyers: Professional Ethics and Business 
Compliance with Regulation, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 201, 239–40 (2009). 
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because they are subject to the same social exigencies, power struggles, 
personal uncertainties and demands of expediency that characterize the 
corporate bureaucratic organization.”173 In-house counsel are often faced 
with strong pressures to follow the wishes of management—their refusal 
to do so may compromise not only their standing within the organization, 
but also their job security.174 As such, they are susceptible to retaliation in 
much the same way as employees are for insubordination, and there have 
been numerous instances of retaliation cases occurring against counsel for 
refusing to follow the wishes of management.175 
While such perceptions cannot and should not be used to generalize all 
attorneys, they do raise concerns that are more likely to be associated with 
the tensions that exist when an entity’s general counsel is simultaneously 
wearing the hat of chief compliance officer, as opposed to a non-lawyer 
acting solely in a compliance role. Senator Chuck Grassley, while leading 
a committee to investigate a large-scale fraud within Tenet Healthcare 
Corporation, one of the largest hospital operators in the country, publicly 
“blasted” the corporation’s joint general counsel and chief compliance 
officer in 2003 for the inherent conflict of interest that allegedly rendered 
her unable to prevent the scandal.176 He expressed that: 
[A]s general counsel, [she] zealously defended [the corporation] 
against claims of ethical and legal non-compliance . . . while as 
chief compliance officer, she supposedly ensured compliance by 
[the corporation’s] officers, directors, and employees. . . .  [I]t 
doesn’t take a pig farmer from Iowa to smell the stench of conflict 
in that arrangement.177 
                                                   
173. Mark A. Sargent, Lawyers in the Moral Maze, 49 VILL. L. REV. 867, 879–80 (2004); see also 
Greg Radinsky, The Compliance Officer Conundrum: Assessing Privilege Issues in a Health Care 
Setting, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 3 (2002) (“[T]he dual roles [of general counsel/CO] will 
make it difficult for the corporate counsel to maintain objectivity when providing advice about the 
deficiencies of the compliance program he/she oversees.”). 
174. Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, The Domains of Corporate Counsel in an Era of 
Compliance, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 203, 246–47 (2016). 
175. See, e.g., Alex B. Long, Retaliatory Discharge and the Ethical Rules Governing Attorneys, 
79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1043, 1083–86 (2008) (discussing numerous cases of attorneys who were 
retaliated against for reporting misconduct, either internally or externally or resisting management); 
Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Resituating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 983, 1005–06 (2005) (discussing the prevalence of retaliation against in-house counsel). 
176. Charles E. Grassley, Grassley Investigates Tenet Healthcare’s Use of Federal Tax Dollars, CHUCK 
GRASSLEY, U.S. SEN. FOR IOWA (Sept. 7, 2003), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-
releases/grassley-investigates-tenet-healthcares-use-federal-tax-dollars [https://perma.cc/LSU7-ASW9]. 
177. Martin, supra note 29, at 170 (internal citations omitted); see also Hutchens, supra note 5, at 
67 (noting that when counsel also wears the hat of compliance officer, it “can become a 
nightmare. . . .”).  
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In contrast to the general counsel’s role, the compliance function, in its 
most fundamental form, is centered around “neutral fact finding,” the 
detection and prevention of misconduct, and assurance that the 
organization operates to facilitate the best interests of all stakeholders, all 
of which involve not just the constituents of an organization but also 
internal and external parties.178 In this way, it has been argued that the 
compliance function is often more focused on the question of whether 
entities “should” take some action, as opposed to the legal department 
historically being sometimes more focused on whether entities “can do 
something.” 179  Additionally, the compliance function also involves 
characteristics that extend beyond legal capabilities into expertise in 
management, training, human resource issues, auditing, communications, 
and internal controls.180 Despite these inherent differences between the 
compliance and legal functions, it is widely acknowledged that the two 
are nevertheless jointly responsible for an entity’s overall adherence to the 
law and regulatory landscape and that thus, even if they are housed in 
separate units, they must be in communication with each other and have 
a good working relationship.181 A healthy partnership between the legal 
and compliance functions helps to ensure a culture of integrity that is 
centered on honesty, fairness, and other crucial values that facilitate 
effective governance.182 
Despite the need for a collaborative partnership in this manner, lawyers 
within the compliance function should also be mindful of the risk of 
liability by regulatory agencies that may seek to hold them personally 
responsible for the compliance failures of their respective organizations. 
Recently, the SEC has expressed an interest in imposing liability against 
in-house counsel and lawyers who carry out gatekeeping roles.183 One 
such threat involves requiring lawyers to “take ownership of violations” 
                                                   
178. DeStefano, supra note 8, at 148 (emphasis omitted) (citing interviews with chief compliance 
officers, including individuals who formerly practiced law, as to the important distinctions between 
the legal and compliance functions); see also Tabuena & Smith, supra note 5, at  25–26.  
179. DeStefano, supra note 8, at 148–49 (emphasis added). 
180. Tabuena & Smith, supra note 5, at 26; see also Roy Snell, Having an Effective Compliance 
Program Is Not About Being Perfect Seasoned Compliance Leader Discusses Program Effectiveness 
Evaluations, 17 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 37, 66 (2015) (discussing the various skills and traits 
of effective compliance officers). 
181. See, e.g., Bird & Park, supra note 174, at 203–05 (discussing the contributions of the Chief Legal 
Officer to the corporate compliance function); Martin, supra note 29, at 184 (noting that practitioners 
have expressed the importance of coordinating legal and compliance functions); David B. Wilkins, Team 
of Rivals—Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2067, 2131–32 (2010) (discussing the interplay between the legal and compliance functions).  
182. Bird & Park, supra note 174, at 236–38. 
183. See Eric Hammesfahr, SEC’s Stein Suggests Attorneys Sign Disclosures, CQ ROLL CALL, 
2014 WL 2119345 (2014) (discussing SEC attempts to impose liability). 
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by including statements and a signature attesting to the accuracy of 
clients’ disclosure statements in SEC filings, a requirement that has 
previously been designated only to chief financial officers under SOX.184 
Stating that “[n]othing focuses the mind like signing your own name,” 
SEC staff have expressed the agency’s desire to hold attorneys in 
compliance roles just as liable as other gatekeepers like accountants and 
auditors, without hiding behind the attorney-client privilege, given their 
involvement in “getting corporations to follow the law in completing 
disclosure documents.” 185  One SEC staff member in particular has 
expressed concern that the attorney-client privilege may have the effect of 
shielding lawyers in compliance roles from responsibility for their 
company’s violations and that they should arguably face the same kind of 
scrutiny as other gatekeepers, given their role in providing advice on 
corporate transactions and reviewing disclosures.186 
Traditionally, the organized bar has heavily resisted government efforts 
to impose responsibility upon lawyers to ensure their clients’ compliance 
with the law.187 In 1975, the ABA expressed that this type of imposition 
would “evoke serious and far-reaching disruption in the role of the lawyer 
as counselor, which would be detrimental to the public, clients, and the 
legal profession.”188 This line of thinking is based on the more traditional 
“moral independence” or “non-accountability” theory of lawyering, 
which takes the view that lawyers are “independent” from their clients and 
thus cannot be morally responsible for the wrongs that their clients 
commit.189  This theory, however, is no longer adequate to reflect the 
                                                   
184. Id. (noting the desire of the SEC to impose liability in this manner); see 18 U.S.C. § 1350(b) 
(2018) (requiring principal executives and financial officers of public companies to certify the 
accuracy of their company’s financial statements).  
185. Hammesfahr, supra note 183. 
186. Id. (“When lawyers provide bad advice or effectively assist in a fraud, sometimes their 
involvement is used as a shield against liability for both themselves and for others.” (citing 
Commissioner Kara M. Stein)). Stein also asked the question “Are we treating lawyers differently 
from other gatekeepers, such as accountants?” Id.; see also Frank C. Razzano, Is the SEC Targeting 
Lawyers?, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 1, 1 (noting the uptick in the SEC targeting lawyers for violations of 
gatekeeping duties); Dylan L. Ruffi, Attorney-Client Privilege in Corporate Administration: A New 
Approach, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 640, 640 (2015) (discussing the “burgeoning concern” 
in the modern corporate world that lawyers who provide dual legal and non-legal roles will “use their 
dual roles as shields against discovery—invoking attorney-client privilege to immunize otherwise 
unprotected communications.”). 
187. Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and Their Clients, 67 
S. CAL. L. REV. 507, 558–59 (1994). 
188 . Id. (citing ABA REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, SECTION ON CORPORATION, 
BANKING, AND BUSINESS LAW (1975)).  
189. See Michal McGinniss, Virtue and Advice: Socratic Perspectives on Lawyer Independence 
and Moral Counseling of Clients, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 1, 8 (2013) (describing the moral 
independence theory as “[a] deep-seated yet controversial precept of our legal system”); see also 
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compliance and gatekeeping roles that many attorneys play in modern 
society, which embody an important public interest role that strays from 
traditional definitions of the practice of law centered on litigation, 
advocacy, and representation in an adversarial setting. As Richard Painter 
has discussed, a model more appropriate to modern day attorney-client 
interactions may be described as a “moral interdependence theory” in 
which it is acknowledged that “[o]ften, lawyers and clients accomplish 
objectives together, not separately.”190 
Lawyers representing clients in transactional, regulatory, and 
compliance contexts have different responsibilities than those 
representing clients in criminal or tort contexts. The latter requires the 
attorney to represent a client who may have committed a crime or tort and 
seeks the help of a lawyer to represent them through the adversarial 
process—in this instance, the attorney is clearly not liable for the client’s 
crime or tort. In contrast, lawyers representing clients in transactional, 
regulatory, and compliance contexts are often advising clients on legal 
and ethical actions to be taken, are more intimately engaged with day-to-
day corporate behavior, and play a substantial role in what information 
the client ultimately decides to self-report or disclose in a public filing.191 
“When lawyers monitor disclosure of information to regulators and 
investors . . . lawyers assume some responsibility for the flow of accurate 
information. A litigator’s responsibility for the integrity of the adversary 
system is not the issue; a corporate lawyer’s responsibility for the integrity 
of the financial markets is.”192 
Thus, even if lawyers have attempted to establish independence from 
clients by objecting to wrongful conduct, that conduct may be said to be 
“imposed by the client upon a compliance or transactional framework 
designed by the lawyer and so contaminates the framework such that the 
lawyer has an obligation to repudiate it in its entirety.”193 This risk is 
particularly relevant to a compliance officer, who is directly involved in 
establishing frameworks, mechanisms, policies, and procedures to ensure 
adherence of the organization to the rules and regulations that govern its 
behavior. For these reasons, it is crucial that the ethical rules governing 
the behavior of lawyers, especially as they pertain to those functioning as 
compliance officers who are not practicing law, provide with absolute 
clarity the extent to which they are obligated, if at all, to provide the 
                                                   
Painter, supra note 187, at 511–16 (discussing the limitations of this theory). 
190. Painter, supra note 187, at 511 (emphasis added). 
191. See id. at 508. 
192. Id. at 570.  
193. Id. 
15 Pacella.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/31/20  12:08 AM 
2020] THE REGULATION OF LAWYERS IN COMPLIANCE 987 
 
organizational client with all of the coveted characteristics that are typical 
of the attorney-client relationship. 
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
To better regulate the professional behavior of lawyers engaged in 
compliance roles, Rule 5.7 is in need of reform. There is sufficient 
evidence that state bars and courts actively enforce Rule 5.7. Various 
courts have disciplined or excluded from representation a number of 
lawyers for violations of the rule.194 In addition, numerous state bars have 
issued ethics opinions, both generally and in response to inquiries, that 
highlight the existence of Rule 5.7 in their jurisdictions and clarify that 
enforcement of the rule will be upheld in situations in which admitted 
attorneys provide law-related services in conjunction with their legal 
services.195 Some of the most recent ethics opinions in this context have 
found that adherence to all of the rules of professional conduct would be 
necessary when the following non-legal services are being provided: 
accounting services that substantially overlapped with legal services; 
instances in which a licensed attorney was acting as a real estate agent 
under a broker’s supervision; the management by lawyers of a for-profit 
adoption agency; the provision of mediation services; when former judges 
engage in law-related businesses; an investment match-making service in 
which lawyers introduced potential investors to clients in search of capital 
for start-up businesses; and the provision of lien search services through 
a law firm’s own employees.196 
This insight from bar associations and courts indicates that enforcement 
of Rule 5.7 likely also applies against compliance officers who are 
admitted attorneys, given that their work can be described as a law-related 
                                                   
194. Sneed v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, 301 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Tenn. 2010); In re Peper, 763 
S.E.2d 205, 209 (S.C. 2014); In re Disciplinary Action Fraley, 709 N.W.2d 624, 625 (Minn. 2006); In 
re Rost, 211 P.3d 145, 156 (Kan. 2009); In re Guste, 118 So. 3d 1023 (La. 2012) (imposing 
disciplinary actions on an attorney for violations of Rule 5.7); In re Disciplinary Action Against 
McCray, 755 N.W.2d 835 (N.D. 2008) (imposing disciplinary actions on an attorney for violations of 
Rule 5.7); see also Larry O. Natt Gantt, II, More Than Lawyers: The Legal and Ethical Implications 
of Counseling Clients on Nonlegal Considerations, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 365, 390 (2005) (noting 
that various courts have disciplined lawyers providing “law-related services” for violating Rule 5.7). 
195. A search on Westlaw on the existence of state bar ethics opinions covering Rule 5.7 yielded 
sixty-six results. See, e.g., N.Y. BAR. ASS’N. COMM. PROF’L. ETHICS, N.Y. Ethics Op. 1135 (2017) 
(clarifying that Rule 5.7 will be enforced by the jurisdiction); UTAH BAR ETHICS ADVISORY OP. 
COMM., Utah Ethics Op. 17-07 (2017) (same); N.C. BAR, N.C. Ethics Op. 10 (2015) (same); N.Y. 
BAR. ASS’N. COMM. PROF’L. ETHICS, N.Y. Ethics Op. 1026 (2014) (same); OHIO BD. COMM’RS. ON 
GRIEVANCE & DISCIPLINE, Ohio Advisory Op. 2013-3 (2013) (same); N.Y. BAR. ASS’N. COMM. 
PROF’L. ETHICS, N.Y. Ethics Op. 958 (2013) (same); N.Y. BAR. ASS’N. COMM. PROF’L. ETHICS, N.Y. 
Ethics Op. 896 (2011) (same). 
196. See supra state bar ethics opinions accompanying note 195, respectively.  
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service subject to the rule. In 2009, the Supreme Court of Kansas 
disbarred a retired attorney on inactive status who continued to “practice 
law” by providing legal advice to clients, appearing in court with clients, 
and splitting fees with another attorney on client matters.197 While these 
actions alone constituted the unauthorized practice of law, the court also 
found that the attorney had violated Rule 5.7 by operating a consulting 
business in which he rendered business advice and accounting services to 
his clients, which were deemed to be law-related services warranting 
reasonable measures to inform clients that a lawyer-client relationship had 
not been established for those services. 198  In failing to provide such 
disclosures, the lawyer had violated the rule; “[t]he principal culprit is the 
possibility that the person for whom the law-related services are 
performed fails to understand that the services may not carry with them 
the protections normally afforded as part of the client-
lawyer  relationship.”199 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana suspended an attorney for charging a 
client an excessive fee in violation of the state’s rules of professional 
conduct.200  In that case, the attorney had represented a nursing home 
resident in both the preparation of a power of attorney and a criminal 
proceeding arising from a hit and run accident. 201  When these legal 
services ended, the attorney continued to assist the client with duties like 
taking him to the bank and running other personal errands with him, for 
which she charged him her hourly fee as an attorney.202 The attorney 
testified that “during her six-month relationship with [the client], he 
frequently told her that he ‘wanted an attorney’ on a full-time basis and 
that because of her legal training, he trusted her to handle his affairs.”203 
The court concluded that the client “came to rely upon [the respondent] 
because of her position as a lawyer and that this confidence did not 
dissipate simply because she had concluded a court case.”204 The court 
went on to explain that this kind of “blur[ring of] the line[s]” between 
legal and non-legal services made it impossible to “draw any line of 
demarcation” between the two, and so treated all of her fees as legal 
fees.205 However, because the court still recognized that the attorney had 
                                                   
197. In re Rost, 211 P.3d at 146–55. 
198. Id. at 156–58. 
199. Id. at 156. 
200. In re Guste, 118 So. 3d 1023, 1032 (La. 2012). 
201. Id. at 1025. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. at 1031. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 1031–33. 
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charged her client for time as a lawyer while she was providing non-legal 
services, her fee was determined to be excessive and she was suspended 
from practice for two years.206 
In one case interpreting New York’s Rule 5.7 (known as Disciplinary 
Rule 1-106 at the time), an attorney was disqualified when he was found 
to have a conflict of interest in representing a plaintiff who was suing a 
school that allegedly discriminated against her. 207  The attorney had 
previously provided non-legal auditing services for the school that was 
being sued, during which time he obtained confidential information about 
the school.208 A dispute existed in that case as to whether the precise 
nature of the work that the attorney had provided to the school was legal 
in nature. Without resolving that exact question, the court upheld the 
presumption that an attorney-client relationship had been formed since it 
was not demonstrated that the client reasonably believed otherwise.209 
There was no evidence that the lawyer had exercised his disclosure option 
to inform the school in advance that legal services were not being 
rendered.210 
Each of these cases offers a fitting example of the perils of non-
disclosure and exemplifies that, in situations where the non-legal work 
may be reasonably interpreted to have legal components, there is a strong 
likelihood that the client will believe that an attorney-client relationship 
is in place. This likelihood is strongest in organizations comprising both 
lawyers and non-lawyers who are engaged in a common goal. For 
example, 
[w]hile a non-lawyer would immediately understand that a law 
graduate who owns and operates a craft brewery is not providing 
“law-related services,” the distinction might not be so clear if an 
attorney is part-owner of a lobbying firm that includes both 
lawyer and non-lawyer lobbyists, a patent firm with both 
attorneys and non-lawyer patent agents, or a tax consulting 
service employing lawyers, accountants, and tax advisors who 
are  neither.211 
In much the same way, constituents of an organization—whether they 
be directors, officers, managers or employees—are likely to be 
susceptible to confusion if their compliance officer is either wearing the 
                                                   
206. Id. 
207. Ehrich v. Binghamton City Sch. Dist., 210 F.R.D. 17, 18–19 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 2002).  
208. Id. at 19. 
209. Id. at 23.  
210. Id. 
211. Spitzer, supra note 20, at 55. 
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dual hat of general counsel or, even if not in that role, is simply a lawyer 
by training.212 There is evidence that this risk is especially significant in 
the compliance context. Some general counsels overseeing compliance 
have noted a frequent perception that: 
There is NO such thing as a non-practicing lawyer—purely 
practical—if you are a lawyer, you are a lawyer. It doesn’t matter 
if you are licensed to practice law or not. People look at you as a 
lawyer and rely on you as it and believe you dispense legal advice 
despite [your] title.213 
As this statement supports, lawyers do tend to embody a certain 
“degree of gravitas” within organizational settings, generally prompting 
individuals within an organization to respond more quickly and 
comprehensively to their requests or inquiries for information.214 
While the potential for confusion as to whether an attorney-client 
relationship exists is high in a compliance context, it is not isolated to it—
in actuality, it commonly occurs whenever various law-related services 
are being provided, whether involving trust officers interacting with bank 
customers, real estate attorneys providing title insurance, or any of the 
other scenarios contemplated by Rule 5.7 that are deemed to be law-
related services.215 For these reasons, Rule 5.7 should be amended to 
incorporate the preventative disclosure obligation that is currently 
contained in the versions of Rule 5.7 adopted by New York, Ohio, 
and  Pennsylvania. 
While some may perhaps view a disclosure obligation of this nature as 
an additional burden for attorneys, the benefits far outweigh the relatively 
small costs of taking these preemptive steps because they would offer a 
mechanism for the attorney to avoid being bound to the full spectrum of 
ethical rules while conducting compliance-only services. In addition, 
recipients of law-related services would be clearly informed from the 
beginning as to the exact nature of their relationship with the lawyer. 
Subsection (2) of Rule 5.7 contains an “out” for lawyers providing law-
related services to avoid being held to all of the other rules if they “take 
reasonable measures to assure that a person obtaining the law-related 
                                                   
212. Remus, supra note 2, at 1280 (noting that “confusion [pertaining to whether a lawyer-client 
relationship has been formed] frequently surrounds” interactions between an attorney not practicing 
law within an organization and the individuals within the entity). 
213 . DeStefano, supra note 8, at 137 (quoting various interviewees holding joint general 
counsel/compliance positions). 
214. MILLER, supra note 28, at 193.  
215. See, e.g., Andrew M. Goldner, Minding Someone Else’s Businesses: Pennsylvania Rule of 
Professional Conduct 5.7 Leads the Way, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 767, 772 (1998) (same); Remus, 
supra note 2, at 1280 (discussing the types of law-related services currently contemplated by the rule). 
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services knows that the services are not legal services and that the 
protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not exist.”216 As noted, 
subsection (2) also refers to “entities” controlled by lawyers and fails to 
explicitly include individual lawyers who may be employees of an 
organization as being able to avail themselves of this option.217 Although, 
as discussed, this subsection is intended to capture all other circumstances 
not covered by subsection (1),218 the potential for confusion remains as to 
whether a lawyer who does not “control” an entity may utilize the 
“reasonable measures” out given the lack of explicit mention in the rule. 
Clarity to this language would ensure that compliance officers, who are 
employees of the organizations that they monitor, 219  would not be 
excluded from the rule’s protective disclosure option. 
An additional problem with Rule 5.7 is that subsection (2)’s use of the 
term “reasonable measures” is fraught with great potential for confusion 
due to its lack of specificity. Neither Rule 5.7 nor the commentary thereto 
explains what constitutes a reasonable measure that would sufficiently 
ensure that the lawyer has successfully avoided application of all of the 
rules.220 Comment 7 to the rule explains that “[t]he burden is upon the 
lawyer to show that the lawyer has taken reasonable measures under the 
circumstances to communicate the desired understanding.” 221  It then 
proceeds to note that what satisfies the threshold of “reasonable measures” 
will differ depending on the “sophisticat[ion] [of the] user of law-related 
services”; “[f]or instance, a sophisticated user of law-related services, 
such as a publicly held corporation, may require a lesser explanation than 
someone unaccustomed to making distinctions between legal services and 
law-related services, such as an individual seeking tax advice from a 
lawyer-accountant or investigative services in connection with 
a  lawsuit.”222 
In the context of compliance services, judging the sophistication of the 
recipient of the law-related services is likely to be quite a challenge given 
that such persons would consist of various identifiable constituents, 
whether employees of any level, members of the management team, the 
board of directors, or other lawyers working in the compliance 
                                                   
216. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (emphasis added). 
217. Id. 
218. See supra notes 114–123, 134–135 and accompanying text. 
219 . Boozang & Handler-Hutchinson, supra note 39, at 108 (“[C]ompliance officers are 
employees of the company they monitor and audit.”).  
220 . See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 5.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (lacking such 
explanations). 
221. Id. cmt. 7. 
222. Id. 
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department—each of whom obviously possesses a differing level of 
comprehension as to the extent to which legal services are distinct from 
law-related services. 223  Therefore, it is important that a lawyer’s 
preventative disclosure be communicated in a consistent manner to any 
and all persons who may be receiving the services. 
Model Rule 1.13, discussed in Part I of this article, which governs the 
behavior of attorneys when they are representing organizations as clients, 
also offers helpful guidance in shaping a disclosure requirement for 
incorporation in Rule 5.7. Model Rule 1.13 contains a reporting obligation 
that requires a lawyer who represents an organization to explain to the 
various constituents of the organization the boundaries of the attorney-
client relationship.224 Subsection (f) of Model Rule 1.13 reads as follows: 
“[i]n dealing with an organization’s directors, officers, employees, 
members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the 
identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know 
that the organization’s interests are adverse to those of the constituents 
with whom the lawyer is dealing.”225 In practice, these requirements are 
arguably comparable to Upjohn warnings, which require in-house counsel 
to warn employees interviewed during internal investigations in advance 
that the interview is subject to the attorney-client privilege only between 
the company and the lawyer, given that the lawyer represents the company 
only, and that the company may opt to waive the privilege and disclose 
the employees’ communications with the lawyer to third parties.226 In this 
way, employees are then alerted to exercise caution, if they so choose, in 
their communications to the lawyer. 
In a similar way, the constituents of an organization regularly 
interacting with lawyer/compliance officers, including the organization’s 
directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other 
constituents (as the language of Model Rule 1.13 captures), should be 
made aware of the precise boundaries of the work being rendered and 
which of those services would trigger the protections of the attorney-client 
relationship. As examined earlier, Model Rule 1.13 requires lawyers 
representing organizations to report violations of the law likely “to result 
in substantial injury to the organization” to its “highest authority” (the 
board of directors or board of trustees); if the board fails to address the 
                                                   
223. See L.T. Lafferty, The Habits of Highly Effective Compliance Officers from Effectiveness to 
Greatness in Your Program Activities, 12 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 11, 15 (2010) (discussing 
the various types of individuals within an entity with whom the compliance officer has daily contact 
and interactions).   
224. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(f) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).  
225. Id. 
226. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).  
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concern or allows it to proceed, lawyers who “reasonably believe 
necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization” may opt to 
make an external report of the violation without obtaining client consent 
and without violating the duty of confidentiality.227 
The unique considerations that emerge when a lawyer is representing 
an organization are also relevant to the lawyer serving as a compliance 
officer for an entity—in both cases, the recipient of the lawyer’s services 
is not an individual person, but rather an organization comprised of 
various individuals. In such instances, it becomes possible that one 
category of constituents may have interests that are adverse to that of the 
organization, such as, for example, in the case of officers or other 
executives committing wrongdoing that ultimately harms the 
organization. 228  Therefore, a reporting requirement, when provided 
through advance written notice, could significantly reduce the potential 
for confusion regarding a compliance lawyer’s duties. In light of these 
considerations, the language of Rule 5.7 should be amended to adopt the 
bolded language below or a similar variation thereof. Paragraph (b) of the 
rule should remain unchanged.229 
(a) A lawyer shall be subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct 
with respect to the provision of law-related services, as defined in 
paragraph (b),230 if the law-related services are provided: 
(1) by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the 
lawyer’s provision of legal services to clients; or 
(2) in other circumstances by the lawyer or by an entity 
controlled by the lawyer individually or with others if the lawyer 
fails to inform the person receiving the services, or, in the case 
of an organization, its duly authorized constituents, in writing 
that the services are not legal services and that the protections 
of a client-lawyer relationship do not exist with respect to the 
law-related services. 
This proposed language incorporates both the heightened disclosure 
obligations of Rule 5.7 adopted by New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio231 
                                                   
227. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(b), (c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
228. See supra notes 172–175. 
229. Paragraph (b) of Model Rule 5.7 currently reads as follows: “[t]he term ‘law-related services’ 
denotes services that might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are related 
to the provision of legal services, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when 
provided by a non-lawyer.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
230. See id. 
231. See N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7 (a)(4), which establishes a presumption that the 
recipient of the non-legal services “believes the services to be the subject of a client-lawyer 
relationship unless the lawyer or law firm has advised the person receiving the services in writing that 
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and the pertinent organizational-related concerns that are highlighted in 
Model Rule 1.13. 232  These amendments would clearly inform the 
recipient of the services in a writing (which would document the 
communication for later reference) that the coveted characteristics of an 
attorney-client relationship, like confidentiality and conflict of interest 
concerns, would not come into play. 
In addition, a minor change to Comment 9 of Model Rule 5.7 is 
warranted. This Comment currently enumerates that the various law-
related services that the ABA has noted serve “a broad range of economic 
and other interests of clients” and trigger adherence to Rule 5.7.233 As 
previously stated, these include “providing title insurance, financial 
planning, accounting, trust services, real estate counseling, legislative 
lobbying, economic analysis, social work, psychological counseling, tax 
preparation, and patent, medical or environmental consulting.” 234  To 
properly reflect the popularity of compliance as an employment option for 
lawyers, the position of “compliance officer” or “compliance services” 
should also be added to this list. By doing so, any and all confusion may 
be eliminated as to whether compliance constitutes a law-related service. 
These changes to Model Rule 5.7 provide the type of guidance that is 
warranted to regulate lawyers in modern-day non-legal or law-related 
fields and would serve as a model for state adoption to help the increasing 
number of lawyers engaged in the compliance function ensure that they 
are properly following the rules that govern their professional duties. 
CONCLUSION 
The field of compliance has developed by leaps and bounds in recent 
decades, thereby giving rise to numerous employment opportunities that 
lawyers have increasingly filled. As a “J.D. Advantage” job, lawyers 
make valuable contributions to the compliance function by applying their 
skills and expertise in the interpretation and analysis of regulations, rules, 
and statutes across various industries.235 Despite the notable increase in 
law graduates and experienced attorneys working as compliance officers 
or within compliance departments, the regulation of lawyers in this space 
has failed to keep pace with these realities. The inefficiencies of the 
                                                   
the services are not legal services and that the protection of a client-lawyer relationship does not exist 
with respect to the non-legal services.” See also OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7 (b)–(c); PA. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7(d). 
232. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).   
233. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7 cmt. 9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
234. Id. 
235. See supra section I.A.  
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existing regulatory model that governs lawyers when acting in a non-legal 
role, such as compliance, give rise to the potential for heightened liability 
because lawyers must ensure that they are following and fulfilling their 
ethical duties, even in duties that do not constitute law practice.236 
The ABA’s Model Rule 5.7, which requires lawyers to follow the full 
panoply of ethical rules when they are providing non-legal, “law-related 
services” is on point for the compliance function, which encompasses the 
exact circumstances in which this rule would be triggered.237 This Article 
closely examines this rule and highlights adoptions of the rule that have 
more successfully articulated the specific responsibilities of lawyers 
engaged in law-related services. It concludes by proposing reform to Rule 
5.7 focused on heightened disclosure obligations that would help navigate 
the murky boundaries between the legal and compliance functions and 
ensure that the recipient of the lawyer’s services is fully aware of the 
extent to which the protections of the attorney-client relationship may or 
may not apply. Such amendments would better protect the unique 
vulnerabilities that have emerged for lawyers in compliance as they 
facilitate and promote the public interest goal that is so fundamental to the 
compliance function. 
 
                                                   
236. See supra Part III. 
237. See supra section II.A. 
